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Abstract 
∎ The Sino-American conflict syndrome contains several elements. It is 
based on a regional status competition, which is increasingly becoming 
global. 
∎ This competition for influence has become combined with an ideological 
antagonism that has recently become more focused on the US side. 
∎ Since the United States and China perceive each other as potential mili-
tary adversaries and plan their operations accordingly, the security dilemma 
also shapes their relationship. 
∎ The strategic rivalry is particularly pronounced on China’s maritime pe-
riphery, dominated by military threat perceptions and the US expectation 
that China intends to establish an exclusive sphere of influence in East 
Asia. 
∎ Global competition for influence is closely interwoven with the techno-
logical dimension of American-Chinese rivalry. It is about dominance in 
the digital age. 
∎ The risk for international politics is that the intensifying strategic rivalry 
between the two states condenses into a structural world conflict. This 
could trigger de-globalization and the emergence of two orders, one under 
the predominant influence of the United States and the other under 
China’s influence. 
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Issues and Conclusions 
The Sino-American World Conflict 
In the United States, China’s rise is widely seen as a 
threat to America’s preeminent international posi-
tion. The perception of China’s further unstoppable 
economic and military rise and a relative decline in 
US power may be based on questionable assumptions 
and projections. However, China is the only great 
power that can potentially threaten the status of the 
United States. Power shifts can jeopardize the stability 
of the international system if the dominant and the 
rising power fail to agree on the leadership and gov-
ernance of the international order. This at least is 
what the power transition theory suggests, which is 
widely debated in the United States and China and 
known as the “Thucydides trap”. This theory is prob-
lematic and its explanatory value controversial. As 
a frame, however, it influences both American and 
Chinese perceptions. On the one hand, it sensitizes 
policy-makers to the risks of the Sino-American com-
petition; on the other hand, in this interpretation, 
conflicts of a more regional or issue-specific nature 
condense into a global hegemonic conflict. 
The narrative of a great power competition propa-
gated by the Trump administration must be seen 
against the background of this debate and the expec-
tation that a rising power will inevitably challenge 
the existing international order. Washington con-
siders China to be a revisionist power that strives for 
regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and, in the 
longer term, for global supremacy. Beijing denies 
such aspirations, but feeds this US perception with 
a more assertive foreign policy. The Trump adminis-
tration has taken an offensive approach to the power 
competition and ideological conflict with China, 
breaking with the previous US China policy of politi-
cal and economic engagement backed up with mili-
tary hedging and deterrence. Its new confrontational 
approach has broad support; there are currently few 
political incentives to take a more relaxed attitude to 
the economic and security threats posed by China. 
The global competition with China seems to become 
the new organizing principle for US foreign policy. 
The danger for international politics is that the 
intensifying strategic rivalry between the two states 
threatens to harden into a structural world conflict. 
In this sense, the talk of a kind of new Cold War often 
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heard in the American debate is not entirely ground-
less, despite all the problems and limitations of anal-
ogies. Analogies, however, do not replace analysis. 
The aim of this research paper is to understand this 
evolving global conflict, the structure of the under-
lying conflict syndrome, the dimensions and dynam-
ics of the current strategic rivalry and the resulting 
consequences for international politics. The Sino-
American world conflict could trigger de-globaliza-
tion and the emergence of two orders, one largely 
under the influence of the United States and the 
other under the influence of China. If such a bipola-
rization of the international system were to occur, 
Germany would find itself in a difficult situation. 
The Sino-American conflict syndrome contains 
several elements. It is based on a regional status com-
petition, which is increasingly becoming global. In 
the United States, the actual and expected increase in 
Chinese power has caused status anxieties. China is 
perceived as a long-term threat to the leading inter-
national position of the United States and the security 
and economic privileges resulting from this position. 
This competition for influence is mixed with an ideo-
logical antagonism, which has recently become more 
prominent on the US side. It is tempting to highlight 
the ideological difference in order to mobilize sus-
tained domestic support for a costly long-term com-
petition. This mixture of status competition and ideo-
logical difference alone gives the conflict syndrome 
its special character. Since the United States and 
China perceive each other as potential military adver-
saries, their relationship is shaped by the dynamics 
of the security dilemma. Security dilemma sensibility 
is rather low on both sides. Both antagonists see 
themselves as defensive powers and attribute offen-
sive intentions to the other side. 
Since China and the United States are potential 
military opponents and not just status competitors 
and system antagonists, their relationship can be 
understood as a complex strategic rivalry. This rivalry 
is particularly pronounced on China’s maritime 
periphery, dominated by military threat perceptions 
and the US expectation that China intends to estab-
lish an exclusive sphere of influence in East Asia. In 
the South China Sea, the American claim to free 
access collides with China’s efforts to establish a secu-
rity zone and to counteract the ability of the United 
States to intervene militarily. 
Less significant, but nevertheless present, are mili-
tary threat perceptions in the global competition for 
influence, which now even includes the Arctic. For 
the Trump administration, China’s growing global 
economic and political presence comes at the expense 
of the United States. Accordingly, the United States 
uses incentives and pressure to discourage other 
states from expanding economic relations with China. 
As the campaign against Huawei shows, the global 
competition for influence is closely interwoven with 
the technological dimension of the Sino-American 
strategic rivalry. It is about technological supremacy 
in the digital age. This conflict dimension is so pro-
nounced because technological leadership creates 
global economic competitive advantages and secures 
the basis for military technological superiority. 
Tighter US export controls are a major part of 
Washington’s policy of technological denial. The 
United States will probably try to involve its allies in 
this policy. Washington has two options that are not 
mutually exclusive but complementary. It could try 
to create a new regime of multilateral export controls, 
similar to CoCom (Coordinating Committee for Multi-
lateral Export Controls), which played an important 
role during the Cold War, or it could deploy the extra-
territorial levers of its export control and sanctions 
laws. In the case of Iran, the Trump administration 
has already demonstrated quite clearly to its allies 
how effective they are. 
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The rise of China represents a unique challenge for 
the United States, which sees itself as a Pacific power 
and global hegemon (although this term is rarely used 
in the United States). On the one hand, China is per-
ceived as an assertive authoritarian power and the 
major potential military opponent; on the other hand, 
the United States and China are closely linked eco-
nomically. The expectation that China will threaten 
traditional US predominance not only in the Western 
Pacific and East Asia, but also globally has shaped 
public perceptions and the elite discourse.1 
It is by no means clear, however, whether China 
will catch up or even overtake the United States 
economically and militarily at all and, if so, when. 
Chinese economic statistics are not reliable and 
projections of current trends problematic.2 Yet the 
American debate on how to deal with China almost 
obsessively focuses on its growing economic and 
military power resources. Indeed, China’s economic 
growth to date has been enormous, if measured by 
gross domestic product (GDP) or other indicators that 
are essentially sub-categories of this criterion, such as 
trade and financial flows. However, GDP, the amount 
of military spending or the Composite Index of 
National Capability (CINC), which includes a variety 
of data sets, do not really provide reliable information 
about a country’s power resources. Based on these 
data, China would have been a superpower in the 
middle of the 19th century; in China, this period is 
remembered as the beginning of the “century of 
humiliation”. As critics argue, these indicators over-
estimate the power potential of populous states. If 
the actual production costs (inputs plus negative 
 
1 See Kim Parker, Rich Morin and Juliana Menasce Horo-
witz, America in 2050 (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Cen-
ter, 21 March 2019). 
2 See Derek Scissors, US-China: Who Is Bigger and When 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, March 
2019). 
externalities) and the expenditures on social wel-
fare and (internal) security are subtracted from these 
“gross resources”, the “net estimate” looks quite dif-
ferent. It then becomes clear that, in terms of power 
resources, the United States is economically and 
militarily far more advanced than the debate about 
China’s rise and America’s relative decline would 
suggest. If one follows this view, then the United 
States will remain the dominant power for a long 
time to come.3 However, China is the only power 
that can at least be described as “emerging potential 
superpower”.4 
Power Transition Theory 
China’s rise in Asia and increasingly worldwide is 
the major geopolitical upheaval the United States has 
been confronted with for some time. Integrating a 
rising great power into the international system is not 
an easy task, as historical experiences indicate.5 Such 
states tend to expand the scope of their activities in 
attempting to secure raw materials, markets and mili-
tary bases and, in the course of this expansion, come 
 
3 See Michael Beckley, “Stop Obsessing about China: Why 
Beijing Will Not Imperil U.S. Hegemony”, Foreign Affairs, 
21 September 2018; id., “The Power of Nations: Measuring 
What Matters”, International Security 43, no. 2 (2018): 7–44; 
id., Unrivaled. Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Super-
power (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2018). 
4 In detail, see Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohl-
forth, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-
first Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global 
Position”, International Security 40, no. 3 (Winter 2015/16):  
7–53. 
5 On the debate, see e.g., Yuen Foong Khong, “Primacy or 
World Order? The United States and China’s Rise – a Review 
Essay”, International Security, 38, no. 3 (Winter 2013/2014): 
153–75; John J. Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?” 
The National Interest, 25 October 2014. 
The United States and the 
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into conflict with other powers, even if emerging 
powers do not pursue an aggressive, revisionist or 
risk-prone foreign policy.6 China has extended its 
activities and enterprises in numerous countries, 
particularly in the wake of the Belt and Road Initia-
tive (BRI). To secure those investments and sea lanes 
of communication, China is strengthening its power 
projection capabilities.7 The expansion of the Chinese 
fleet represents a challenge to the United States as 
the preponderant naval power and to its “maritime 
hegemony”.8 
Power shifts pose a considerable 
risk to the stability of the 
international system. 
Power shifts pose a considerable risk to the stabil-
ity of the international system, unless the ascending 
power and the previously superior power can reach 
an understanding. At least, this seems to be the case 
if one follows two theories anchored in the “realist” 
view of international relations: the power transition 
theory and the power cycle theory. Both are modern 
variants of Thucydides interpretation of the Pelopon-
nesian war as an inevitable result of the rising power 
of the Athenians instilling fear in the Spartans and 
forcing them to go to war.9 He is thus regarded as 
the founder of the theory of “hegemonic wars”.10 In 
today’s power transition theories, a roughly equal 
distribution of power is seen as triggering war, an un-
 
6 In general, see Randall L. Schweller, “Managing the Rise 
of Great Powers. History and Theory”, in Engaging China. The 
Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston 
and Robert S. Ross (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 
1–31. 
7 See Gal Luft, Silk Road 2.0: US Strategy toward China’s Belt 
and Road Initiative (Washington; D.C.: Atlantic Council, 
October 2017), 47f. 
8 See Michael Paul, Kriegsgefahr im Pazifik? Die maritime Be-
deutung der sino-amerikanischen Rivalität (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2017); on “maritime hegemony” see, Robert S. Ross, “Nation-
alism, Geopolitics, and Naval Expansionism from the Nine-
teenth Century to the Rise of China”, Naval War College Review 
71, no. 4 (2018): 10–44. 
9 Thukydides, Der Peloponnesische Krieg (Stuttgart: Reclam, 
1966), I, 23, 57. 
10 Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War”, in The 
Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and 
Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), 15–37. 
equal one, on the other hand, as promoting peace.11 
This is based on the consideration that differences in 
economic, social and political modernization between 
states lead to changes in the distribution of power 
and that the probability of war is greatest when a 
non-saturated challenger approaches the leading state 
in the international system – the controversial issue 
is whether the challenger takes up arms or the lead-
ing power begins a preventive war.12 The power tran-
sition hypothesis can also be found in those historical-
structural theories that attempt to explain the devel-
opment of the modern state system through cyclical 
processes. Hegemonic wars, i.e. those between the 
hegemonic power and the challenger over the leader-
ship and order of the international system, result 
from the imbalance between the political order of the 
international system and the actual distribution of 
power, which changes historically due to uneven 
growth processes.13 
Variations of the power transition theory are often 
found in the US debate and shape the view of China’s 
rise.14 Awareness of the risks associated with Beijing’s 
increase in power is also pronounced in the Chinese 
discourse. Like the American expert discourse, it is 
characterized by realist views (especially offensive 
realism) and ideas of power transition.15 In the Chi-
nese strategic discourse, it is widely expected that the 
United States, as the most powerful country, will use 
its resources to preserve its status and privileges and 
prevent China from rising further.16 
 
11 See Jacek Kugler and A. F. K. Organski, “The Power Tran-
sition: a Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation”, in Hand-
book of War Studies, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Boston et al.: 
Unwin Hyman, 1989), 171–94. 
12 See Randall L. Schweller, “Domestic Structure and Pre-
ventive War. Are Democracies More Pacific?” World Politics 
44, no. 2 (1992): 235–69. 
13 See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cam-
bridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
14 See, e.g., Christopher Layne, “The US-Chinese Power 
Shift and the End of the Pax Americana”, International Affairs 
94, no. 1 (2018): 89–111. 
15 See See-Won Byun, “China’s Major-Powers Discourse in 
the Xi Jinping Era: Tragedy of Great Power Politics Revisited?” 
Asian Perspective 40 (2016): 493–522. 
16 See Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, “How China 
Sees America: The Sum of Beijing’s Fears”, Foreign Affairs 91, 
no. 5 (2012): 32–47; Suisheng Zhao, “A New Model of Big 
Power Relations? China-US Strategic Rivalry and Balance of 
Power in the Asia-Pacific”, Journal of Contemporary China 24, 
no. 93 (2015): 377–97. 
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The discussion in both the United States and China 
about the so-called “Thucydides trap”17 testifies to 
the awareness of the risks associated with China’s 
rise. During Barack Obama’s presidency, the basic 
line expressed in numerous public statements was 
one of being aware of the risks that arise when a 
rising power gets into conflict with a leading one. Top 
Chinese government officials and President Xi Jinping 
himself have repeatedly declared their intention to 
avoid the “Thucydides trap”.18 Sensibility to the risks 
resulting from China’s rise has been reflected in talk 
of seeking a “new type of great power relationship” 
between the United States and China. This concept 
propagated by Xi Jinping in 2012 and the subject of 
a lively debate in China remains limited to a few 
abstract principles, namely renunciation of confron-
tation, mutual respect with regard to unspecified 
core interests and a win-win orientation.19 
Power transition theories are problematic and their 
explanatory value is controversial. However, they are 
not only theoretical notions, but also “political con-
structs”.20 In this sense, they act as a frame, thereby 
influencing perceptions. Frames contextualize facts 
and structure the flow of events. They serve to define 
problems and to diagnose their causes. They provide 
criteria for assessing developments, offer solutions 
 
17 With this term the political scientist Graham Allison 
has popularized the core idea of power transition theories 
in a wealth of Kassandra-like publications since 2012. See 
Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and 
China Headed for War?” The Atlantic, 24 September 2015. 
18 See Rosemary Foot, “Constraints on Conflict in the Asia-
Pacific: Balancing ‘the War Ledger’”, Political Science 66, no. 2 
(2014): 119–42 (129ff.). 
19 See Jinghan Zeng, “Constructing a ‘New Type of Great 
Power Relations’: The State of Debate in China (1998–2014)”, 
The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 18, no. 2 
(2016): 422–442; Gudrun Wacker, “The Irreversible Rise. 
A New Foreign Policy for a Stronger China”, in Xi’s Policy 
Gambles: The Bumpy Road Ahead, ed. Alessia Amighini and Axel 
Berkofsky (Milan: Italian Institute for International Political 
Studies, 2015), 65–77 (67f.). 
20 Here and on the following, see Steve Chan, The Power-
Transition Discourse and China’s Rise (Oxford: Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia of Politics, May 2017), quote on p. 17; id., 
“More Than One Trap: Problematic Interpretations and Over-
looked Lessons from Thucydides”, Journal of Chinese Political 
Science 24, no. 1 (2019): 11–24. 
and set boundaries to a discourse. In this way, they 
contribute to the construction of political reality.21 
Within the power transition frame, conflicts in 
specific areas that have a more regional or local char-
acter gain such salience that they add up to a global 
hegemonic rivalry. To the extent that Chinese policies 
nourish and strengthen this perception in the United 
States, this might lead to a kind of self-fulfilling 
prophecy. At the very least, this prevailing frame can 
have a conflict-hardening effect resulting from the 
built-in expectation that a rising power will inevitably 
question the existing international order.22 From this 
perspective, it does not require a more nuanced dis-
cussion as to what extent and in what sense China 
actually acts as a revisionist power. Revisionism can 
be revolutionary, i.e. it can be aimed at revolutioniz-
ing international norms, institutions and the status 
hierarchy, but it can also be reform-oriented and 
aimed at changing some institutions and norms, and 
increasing the status of one’s own country.23 Revision-
ism is a discursively created label serving domestic 
and foreign policy purposes, but it hardly describes 
the entire state behaviour. States may aim to main-
tain the status quo in some areas, and be revisionist 
in others.24 China does not fundamentally question 
the existing international order. This order consists 
of many principles, norms and functional regimes. 
China supports some and rejects others.25 The term 
“revisionist stakeholder” most aptly sums up the 
Chinese position: China operates within the frame-
work of existing international organizations, espe-
 
21 On the role of framing, see Robert M. Entman, Projections 
of Power. Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Chi-
cago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 5f. 
22 For a critical view, see Richard Ned Lebow and Benjamin 
Valentino, “Lost in Transition: a Critical Analysis of Power 
Transition Theory”, International Relations 23, no. 3 (2009): 
389–410. 
23 On this differentiation, see Barry Buzan, “China in Inter-
national Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?” The Chinese Jour-
nal of International Politics 3, no. 1 (2010): 5–36 (17f.). 
24 See Steve Chan, Weixing Hu and Kai He, “Discerning 
States’ Revisionist and Status-quo Orientations: Comparing 
China and the US”, European Journal of International Relations 
25, no. 2 (2019): 613–40. 
25 See Alastair Iain Johnston, “The Failures of the ‘Failure 
of Engagement’ with China”, The Washington Quarterly 42, 
no. 2 (2019): 99–114 (100–103). In addition, see Zhongying 
Pang, “China and the Struggle over the Future of Interna-
tional Order”, in The Rise and Decline of the Post-Cold War Order, 
ed. Hanns W. Maull (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2018), 235–51. 
The United States and the Rise of China 
SWP Berlin 
The Sino-American World Conflict 
February 2020 
10 
cially within the UN system, and insists on a tradi-
tional understanding of state sovereignty. However, 
it rejects US and Western dominance in international 
institutions and is dissatisfied with its own status. 
From the Chinese perspective, this status no longer 
corresponds to the country’s increased power and the 
decline of the United States.26 Incidentally, in China, 
the United States is regarded as a revisionist power 
that has sought to transform the international en-
vironment since the end of the East-West conflict.27 
Great Power Competition as Narrative 
If one takes official documents and statements as a 
yardstick, the prevailing perception in the United 
States is that China is thoroughly “revisionist”. The 
hope that China’s integration into international insti-
tutions and into the international economy would 
make it a reliable partner has proved to be false. 
Rather, China and Russia, too, are aiming to shape 
“a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests.” 
Furthermore, the 2017 National Security Strategy 
states that both powers “are contesting our geopoliti-
cal advantages and trying to change the international 
order in their favor.”28 According to the Pentagon, 
China “seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the 
near-term and, ultimately global preeminence in 
the long-term”.29 As Secretary of State Pompeo put it, 
“China wants to be the dominant economic and mili-
tary power of the world, spreading its authoritarian 
vision for society and its corrupt practices world-
 
26 Suisheng Zhao, “A Revisionist Stakeholder: China and 
the Post-World War II World Order”, Journal of Contemporary 
China 27, no. 113 (2018): 643–58. For a differentiated view 
of the Chinese position, also see Michael J. Mazarr, Timothy 
R. Heath and Astrid Stuth Cevallos, China and the Inter-
national Order (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2018). 
27 See Nathan and Scobell, “How China Sees America” (see 
note 16); Jennifer Lind, “Asia’s Other Revisionist Power. Why 
U.S. Grand Strategy Unnerves China”, Foreign Affairs 96, no. 2 
(2017): 74–82. 
28 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America (Washington, D.C., December 2017), 3, 
quotes on p. 25 and p. 27. 
29 Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. 
Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region 
(Washington, D.C., 1 June 2019), 8. 
wide”.30 As these statements indicate, the Trump 
administration bases is approach in dealing with 
China on “worst case” assumptions about the long-
term intentions of the leadership in Beijing.31 
According to the Trump administration, the stra-
tegic competition and the ideological conflict with an 
expansive and authoritarian China will be carried out 
offensively. As Vice President Pence said, Washington 
wants “to reset America’s economic and strategic rela-
tionship with China, to finally put America first”.32 
The Trump administration obviously sees the rela-
tionship with China through the lens of a “zero-sum 
logic”.33 The idea that both sides could benefit from 
the intensification of relations seems far-fetched to 
leading actors in this administration. Accordingly, it 
has broken with the previous US approach in dealing 
with China. 
Before Trump, the goal of US strategy was to more 
closely integrate China into the international system, 
ideally as a constructive actor in a great power con-
cert under US leadership. This strategy, however, 
by no means presupposed that China’s further rise 
would necessarily take place peacefully. Former US 
administrations also reckoned with the possibility 
that geopolitical rivalry might become paramount. 
Therefore, preserving US military superiority and 
expanding security relations with states in the Asia-
Pacific region were key elements of the traditional 
approach, which merged cooperative engagement 
with hedging. Since the mid-2000s, military hedging 
has played an increasingly important role; this was a 
reaction to China’s rapid economic rise, military mod-
ernization and the country’s incipient global expan-
sion. A clear expression of American determination to 
 
30 As quoted in Edward Wong and Catie Edmonson, 
“Trump Administration Plans to Sell More than $2 Billion 
of Arms to Taiwan”, The New York Times, 6 June 2019. 
31 On the scholarly debate as to whether states can safely 
assess the intentions of other powers, see Sebastian Rosato, 
“The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers”, International 
Security, 39, no. 3 (Winter 2014/15): 48–88. 
32 “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administra-
tion’s Policy toward China”, Washington, D.C.: Hudson Insti-
tute, 4 October 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-
policy-toward-china/ (“to re-set America’s economic and stra-
tegic relationship, to finally put America first”). 
33 On the different logics, see Thomas J. Christensen, 
“Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China 
and U.S. Policy toward Asia”, International Security 31, no. 1 
(2006): 81–126. 
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remain an Asia-Pacific power and not to accept 
China’s regional hegemony was the so-called ‘re-
balancing’ under Obama, which consisted of streng-
thening the alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region, 
intensifying relations with regional states such as 
India and Vietnam, more involvement in regional 
organizations and deeper economic integration 
through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).34 
Talk of a new era of great power competition and 
the alleged failure of the previous policy had already 
begun under President Obama. The topos of an “asser-
tive China” began to shape the American discourse.35 
Under Obama, however, the White House tried to 
contain the discourse and instructed the Pentagon not 
to use the term “great power competition”; since this 
could give the impression that the United States and 
China were almost inevitably on a collision course.36 
The Trump administration is 
resolutely propagating the narrative 
of great power competition. 
The Trump administration is resolutely propagat-
ing the narrative of great power competition, thereby 
shaping the China debate in the unique way that only 
“authoritative speakers” such as a president and mem-
bers of his administration can do. Narratives present 
an interpretation of the past (“failure of the coopera-
tive China policy”), they interpret the current situation 
(“China disputes US supremacy”) and offer strategic 
instruction for future action (“offensively competing 
with all power resources”).37 
 
34 See, e.g., Reinhard Wolf, “The U.S. as a Pacific Power? 
Chinas Aufstieg und die Zukunft der amerikanischen Welt-
führungspolitik”, in Weltmacht vor neuen Herausforderungen. 
Die Außenpolitik der USA in der Ära Obama, ed. Steffen Hage-
mann, Wolfgang Tönnesmann and Jürgen Wilzewski (Trier: 
Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2014), 87–113. 
35 See Harry Harding, “Has U.S. China Policy Failed?”, The 
Washington Quarterly 38, no. 3 (2015): 95–122; Björn Jerdén, 
“The Assertive China Narrative: Why It Is Wrong and How So 
Many Still Bought into It”, The Chinese Journal of International 
Politics 7, no. 1 (2014): 47–88; Alastair Iain Johnston, “How 
New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?” International 
Security 37, no. 4 (2013): 7–48. 
36 See David B. Larter, “White House Tells the Pentagon to 
Quit Talking about ‘Competition’ with China”, Navy Times, 
26 September 2016. 
37 “Dominant narratives of national security establish the 
common-sense givens of debate, set the boundaries of the 
legitimate, limit what political actors inside and outside 
In the Chinese discourse, the US narrative of great 
power competition is criticized as reflecting a Cold 
War and zero-sum mentality.38 The Chinese govern-
ment denies striving for hegemony or establishing 
spheres of influence. China insists it will not follow 
the path taken by other rising great powers.39 China 
wants to become an economic, technological and cul-
tural world power, exerting greater influence on the 
rules of international politics.40 That, at least, is the 
vision Xi Jinping is pursuing as part of his aim to re-
juvenate the Chinese nation. He has thus linked the 
Communist Party’s claim to legitimacy with China 
becoming a leading world power.41 
 
the halls of power can publicly justify, and resist efforts to 
remake the landscape of legitimation.” Ronald R. Krebs, 
Narrative and the Making of US National Security (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 3. 
38 See Michael D. Swaine, Chinese Views on the U.S. National 
Security and National Defense Strategies (Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, China Leader-
ship Monitor, 1 May 2018). 
39 “In the future, no matter how strong it becomes, China 
shall never threaten anyone, seek hegemony or establish 
spheres of influence. History has proven and will continue 
to prove that China will not follow the beaten path of big 
powers seeking hegemony when it grows strong. Hegemony 
does not conform to China’s values and national interests.” 
Speech at the 18th Shangri-La Dialogue by Gen. Wei Fenghe, 
State Councilor and Minister of National Defense, PRC, 
2 June 2019. 
40 Chu Shulong and Zhou Lanjun, “The Growing U.S.-
China Competition under the Trump Administration”, in 
National Committee on American Foreign Policy, U.S.-China 
Relations: Manageable Differences or Major Crisis? (New York, 
October 2018), 10–18. 
41 Elizabeth C. Economy, The Third Revolution. Xi Jinping and 
the New Chinese State (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2018), 190. 
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Current conflicts in US-China relations are often 
interpreted as a kind of new “Cold War” – or at least 
the Cold War is taken as reference to highlight the 
differences between the Sino-American and the US-
Soviet conflict.42 Indeed, American-Chinese relations 
contain some elements that, despite all their differ-
ences, suggest a certain analogy to the Cold War or, 
more precisely, to the East-West conflict syndrome 
combining ideological antagonism, security dilemma, 
arms competition and global power rivalry.43 Like any 
analogy, however, this one is problematic and of 
limited use. 
Status Competition 
The US-Chinese conflict is based on a regional and 
global competition for status in an international 
system characterized by an emerging bipolarity. The 
international constellation between the end of the 
Second World War and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union is generally regarded as bipolar. Even though 
power resources were by no means equally distribut-
ed between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
the gap between these two states and the remaining 
powers was considerable. If one understands bipolar-
ity in the sense of the distribution of power in the 
international system, then one can speak of a new 
 
42 See e.g. Charles Edel and Hal Brands, “The Real Origins 
of the U.S.-China Cold War”, Foreign Policy, 2 June 2019; 
David L. Roll, “The Key to Avoiding a New Cold War with 
China”, The Washington Post, 10 July 2019. 
43 For interpretations of the East-West conflict, see Ernst-
Otto Czempiel, Weltpolitik im Umbruch. Das internationale System 
nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts (Munich, 1991), 20–26; 
the notion of “conflict syndrome” is used by Werner Link, 
Der Ost-West-Konflikt. Die Organisation der internationalen Bezie-
hungen im 20. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1988). 
bipolarity, even though there is certainly no parity of 
power between America and China.44 
In contrast to the Cold War, however, the relation-
ship between the United States and China is not a 
confrontation between two isolated opposing blocs, 
but a competition for influence within a globalized 
international system in which the two powers are 
highly intertwined economically.45 As far as trade 
in goods is concerned, in 2018 China was America’s 
number one trading partner – the third largest ex-
port market for American products and the main 
source of imports. For China, the United States tops 
the list of buyers of Chinese products.46 There is also a 
high degree of “industrial interdependence”47 between 
the two economies, which has developed since the 
early 1990s as a result of an almost revolutionary 
change in the organization of industrial production: 
components manufactured in China are used in many 
US products. Mutual dependencies have also arisen 
because China had long held the largest share of US 
treasury bonds until Japan overtook it in July 2019.48 
 
44 See Øystein Tunsjø, The Return of Bipolarity in World 
Politics. China, the United States, and Geostructural Realism (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2018). In addition, see 
Richard Maher, “Bipolarity and the Future of U.S.-China Re-
lations”, Political Science Quarterly 133, no. 3 (2018): 497–525. 
45 See “Policy Roundtable: Are the United States and China 
in a New Cold War?” Texas National Security Review, 15 May 
2018. 
46 See Andres B. Schwarzenberg, U.S.-China Trade and Eco-
nomic Relations: Overview, In Focus (Washington, D.C.: Con-
gressional Research Service [CRS], 7 August 2019). 
47 Barry C. Lynn, “War, Trade and Utopia”, The National 
Interest 82 (Winter 2005/06): 31–38. 
48 Occasionally one hears the fear that China’s position 
as an important creditor would give Beijing leverage. But 
because of the economic interdependence between the 
United States and China, it would also have a negative im-
pact on China if it were to sell Treasury bonds on a large 
scale. In addition, this would lower the dollar exchange 
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China’s increased power has fueled 
US fears it might lose its status as the 
predominant superpower. 
China’s actual and projected increase in power has 
aroused anxiety in the United States that it might lose 
its status as the predominant international super-
power. States (or more precisely, the actors represent-
ing them) may aspire to high status as an end in itself, 
as social-psychological approaches postulate: a high 
status creates the satisfying feeling of superiority over 
other persons or states, and concerns about losing 
one’s status appear to threaten one’s own identity. 
But status is also associated with material gains. In 
the long run, China threatens not only the status of 
the United States as the lone superpower, but also 
the resulting privileges and economic advantages,49 
whose nature and extent are assessed quite differently 
in the academic discussion.50 If China were to become 
the predominant political, economic and technologi-
cal power in the world, it could, as the United States 
fears, widely set rules and standards and establish a 
 
rate – and thus the value of the debt remaining in Chinese 
hands. In a July 2012 report, the US Department of Defense 
came to the conclusion that US government bonds do not 
provide China with any coercive means or deterrent option. 
See Andres B. Schwarzenberg, U.S.-China Investment Ties: Over-
view and Issues for Congress, In Focus (Washington, D.C.: Con-
gressional Research Service, 28 August 2019). On this issue, 
also see Daniel W. Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s 
Financial Influence in Great Power Politics”, International 
Security 34, no. 2 (2009): 7–45. 
49 See William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Compe-
tition, and Great Power War”, World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 
28–57; Tudor A. Onea, “Between Dominance and Decline: 
Status Anxiety and Great Power Rivalry”, Review of Inter-
national Studies 40, no. 1 (2014): 125–152; Johannes Sauer-
land and Reinhard Wolf, “Lateraler Druck, Statusansprüche 
und die Ursachen revisionistischer Großmachtpolitik”, Zeit-
schrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik 10, no. 1 (2017), Special 
Issue “Revisionismus in der internationalen Politik”, 25–43; 
Timothy R. Heath, “The Competition for Status Could In-
crease the Risk of a Military Clash in Asia”, The Rand Blog, 
2 February 2018. 
50 See Michael Mastanduno, “System Maker und Privilege 
Taker. U.S. Power and the International Political Economy”, 
World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 121–54; Daniel W. Drezner, 
“Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly as Much as You Think)”, 
International Security 38, no. 1 (2013): 52–79; Doug Stokes 
and Kit Waterman, “Security Leverage, Structural Power and 
US Strategy in East Asia”, International Affairs 93, no. 5 (2017): 
1039–60. 
kind of “illiberal sphere of influence”. If this were to 
happen, American security and prosperity would no 
longer be guaranteed to the same extent as before.51 
The fear is that the United States would no longer be 
the undisputed number one, that the dollar would 
become less significant as the international reserve 
currency and that the country would no longer be 
attractive for the financial inflows that help secure 
American prosperity. Under these conditions, the 
United States would see its freedom of action cur-
tailed.52 
Ideological Difference 
One may speculate as to whether, from an American 
perspective, competition for power and status would 
be less fierce and whether the consequences for the 
hegemonic position of the United States would appear 
less threatening if China were a liberal democracy. 
Nevertheless, the competition for status is interwoven 
with an ideological antagonism. Unlike in the case of 
the East-West confrontation, this is not the core of the 
US-Chinese rivalry. As a reminder, Soviet ideology com-
pletely ruled out any permanent coexistence with 
the capitalist system led by the United States, and the 
ultimately inevitable victory of communism world-
wide was seen as guaranteeing the security of the 
Soviet Union. This element is missing in the Sino-
American conflict. China’s view is “nationalist rather 
than internationalist”.53 
Of course, the human rights situation in China 
has always been a source of friction in Sino-American 
relations; but as long as China’s rise was not per-
ceived as a global challenge and as long as there was 
hope that China would liberalize, the country was not 
seen as an ideological antagonist in the United States. 
From the Chinese perspective, the ideological dimen-
sion has always been more pronounced since Western 
ideas of liberal democracy and freedom of expression 
 
51 See Ely Ratner, “There Is No Grand Bargain with China”, 
Foreign Affairs, 27 November 2018. 
52 Ashley J. Tellis, Balancing without Containment. An Ameri-
can Strategy for Managing China (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2014), 14, 18f. 
53 Odd Arne Westad, “The Sources of Chinese Conduct. Are 
Washington and Beijing Fighting a New Cold War?” Foreign 
Affairs, 12 August 2019. 
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threaten the ideological dominance of the Com-
munist Party.54 
Following recent debates in the United States, one 
might get the impression that the ideological conflict 
between the American and Chinese systems is of a 
similar dimension to that between Western democracy 
and Soviet communism.55 It is argued that China’s 
economically successful “authoritarian capitalism” 
could find international resonance at a time when con-
fidence in the systemic superiority of “democratic 
capitalism” is weakening. In this scenario, geopoliti-
cal power competition is mixed with an ideological 
system antagonism.56 China is even portrayed as an 
“existential” threat to the United States and the world 
order.57 Stephen Bannon, Trump’s former advisor, has 
elevated the “rapidly militarizing totalitarian” China 
to “the greatest existential threat ever faced by the 
United States”.58 He is one of the founders of the new 
“Committee on the Present Danger”, which, like its 
predecessors in the 1950s and 1970s that were directed 
against the Soviet Union, wants to sensitize the public 
to this new danger and mobilize for a policy of con-
tainment, the ultimate goal of which is to end com-
munist rule in China. As long as the Communist Party 
is in power, there will be no hope of coexistence: this 
is one of the guiding principles of the Committee on 
the Present Danger.59 
The Trump administration has 
stylized the conflict with China as an 
ideological one, even as a conflict 
between “civilizations”. 
The Trump administration has stylized the conflict 
with China as an ideological one, even as a conflict 
 
54 See Elsa Kania, “The ‘Regime Security Dilemma’ in US-
China Relations”, The Strategist, 21 March 2019. 
55 Robert D. Kaplan, “A New Cold War Has Begun”, Foreign 
Policy, 7 January 2019. 
56 For this view see Tarun Chhabra, The China Challenge, 
Democracy, and U.S. Grand Strategy, Policy Brief (Washington, 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 15 February 2019). 
57 David Brooks, “How China Brings Us Together. An 
Existential Threat for the 21st Century”, The New York Times, 
14 February 2019. 
58 Stephen Bannon, “We’re in an Economic War with 
China. It’s Futile to Compromise”, The Washington Post, 6 May 
2019. 
59 See Josh Rogin, “China Hawks Call on America to Fight 
a New Cold War”, The Washington Post, 10 April 2019. 
between “civilizations”.60 China wants nothing less 
than to “reorder the world”.61 Such a view plays down 
the fact that China lacks a “coherent ideology with 
international appeal”62 and that Chinese policies are 
not aimed at establishing clientele regimes of its own 
ideological orientation, as the Soviet Union once 
did.63 The Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping propa-
gates a kind of “Chinese model” for developing and 
emerging countries, thereby questioning liberal de-
mocracy as a political ideal. China’s model of govern-
ance may be attractive for authoritarian states or 
those that slide into authoritarianism.64 However, 
China’s economic success is based on specific precon-
ditions, a large domestic market, an abundance of 
labour, the willingness of an authoritarian govern-
ment to experiment and pragmatic improvisation. 
China supports many authoritarian regimes, exports 
surveillance technology and exerts pressure on criti-
cal voices abroad. But this does not add up to a 
 
60 As the then director of policy planning in the State 
Department, Kiron Skinner, said, the United States is in a 
“fight with a really different civilization and a different 
ideology, and the United States hasn’t had that before […] 
it’s the first time that we’ll have a great power competitor 
that is not Caucasian”. Quotes in Abraham M. Denmark, 
“Problematic Thinking on China from the State Depart-
ment’s Head of Policy Planning”, War on the Rocks, 7 May 
2019. 
61 “Today, China is working to export its model of authori-
tarianism through its ‘Community of Common Destiny’ to 
reshape global governance, utilizing the power of the Chinese 
economy to coerce and corrupt governments around the 
world that are already suffering from underdeveloped or un-
stable democracies and taking advantage of countries suf-
fering from financial instability to push them toward the 
desired end state. Ultimately, China seems to think that it 
really can reorder the world”. Christopher A. Ford, Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Security and Nonprolifer-
ation, “Technology and Power in China’s Geopolitical Am-
bitions”, Testimony to the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, Washington, D.C., 20 June 2019. 
62 Jessica Chen Weiss, “No, China and the U.S. Aren’t 
Locked in an Ideological Battle. Not Even Close”, The Washing-
ton Post, 4 May 2019. 
63 See Kevin Rudd, “How to Avoid an Avoidable War. Ten 
Questions about the New U.S. China Strategy”, Foreign Affairs, 
22 October 2018. 
64 See Andreas Møller Mulvad, “Xiism as a Hegemonic Proj-
ect in the Making: Sino-communist Ideology and the Political 
Economy of China’s Rise”, Review of International Studies 45, 
no. 3 (2019): 449–470; Economy, The Third Revolution 
(see note 41), 221. 
 Security Dilemma 
 SWP Berlin 
 The Sino-American World Conflict 
 February 2020 
 15 
struggle against democracy and a strategy to under-
mine democratic systems.65 Nevertheless, it can be 
expected that the US side will increasingly push its 
narrative of a systemic conflict between “digital 
authoritarianism” and “liberal democracy”66 – since 
it helps mobilize long-term domestic political support 
for a costly confrontational policy towards China.67 
Security Dilemma 
Even though the ideological conflict is not the pri-
mary conflict layer, by increasingly accentuating the 
“ideological difference”,68 threat perceptions are 
expected to intensify, thus reinforcing the security 
dilemma between the United States and China. Just 
as the East-West conflict could not be reduced to a 
security dilemma, the Sino-American conflict cannot 
be reduced to one either.69 
A security dilemma means the following: In an 
“anarchic” international system, i.e. a system without 
a superior authority, no state can be certain of being 
attacked, dominated or even extinguished. Measures 
to strengthen one’s own security, whether through 
arms, territorial expansion or alliances, can, however, 
reduce the security of other states and thus lead to 
power and arms competitions.70 Strictly speaking, one 
 
65 See Jessica Chen Weiss, “A World Safe for Autocracy? 
China’s Rise and the Future of Global Politics”, Foreign Affairs 
98, no. 4 (2019): 92–102; in addition, see Emily S. Chen, 
Is China Challenging the Global State of Democracy? (Honolulu: 
Pacific Forum, June 2019). 
66 Nicholas Wright, “How Artificial Intelligence Will 
Reshape the Global Order. The Coming Competition between 
Digital Authoritarianism and Liberal Democracy”, Foreign 
Affairs, 10 July 2018. 
67 On the ideological dimension of great power conflicts, 
see Hal Brands, “Democracy vs Authoritarianism: How Ideol-
ogy Shapes Great-Power Conflict”, Survival 60, no. 5 (2018): 
61–114. 
68 On the general role of “ideological difference” in threat 
perceptions, see Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great 
Power Politics, 1789–1989 (Ithaca and London: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 2005). 
69 On the question as to whether there was a security 
dilemma during the Cold War, see Robert Jervis, “Was the 
Cold War a Security Dilemma?” Journal of Cold War Studies 3, 
no. 1 (2001): 36–60. 
70 John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security 
Dilemma”, World Politics 2, no. 2 (1950): 157–80; Robert 
Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”, World 
Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214; Charles L. Glaser, “The 
should distinguish between two interrelated di-
lemmas.71 Firstly, at the level of foreign policy, there 
is the fundamental “dilemma of interpretation” that 
arises when assessing the intentions and capabilities 
of other states. Are they defensive and concerned 
only with their own security, or do they have offen-
sive intentions? Secondly, the “dilemma of reaction” 
presents itself as soon as politicians and planners 
have interpreted the behaviour of another state in a 
certain way and have to choose between the alterna-
tives of strengthening their own defence for the pur-
pose of deterrence or sending appeasing signals. If 
one side expands its own military capabilities under 
the false assumption of aggressive intentions by the 
other side, this may trigger a spiral of hardening hos-
tility. This is where the “security paradox” comes into 
play at the level of interaction: measures to strengthen 
one’s own security can lead to more insecurity. If, 
however, the intentions and capabilities of the other 
side are wrongly assessed as non-aggressive, a state 
may expose itself to dangers. 
In its “classical” form, the concept of the security 
dilemma refers to a situation in which offensive mili-
tary doctrines and offensive military capabilities pose 
a threat to territorial integrity, either in the form of 
an invasion or in the form of a nuclear first strike. 
Vis-à-vis China, the United States has not accepted 
mutual nuclear vulnerability as the basis of its stra-
tegic relationship.72 This could, it is feared, be under-
stood as a lack of American resolve to defend its allies 
and interests in Asia. Moreover, Beijing would prob-
ably not be convinced by any US statements that it 
does not have plans to eliminate China’s nuclear 
capability in case of an escalating crisis.73 Similarly, 
China does not trust American assurances that the 
development of missile defence systems is not directed 
against China’s strategic nuclear potential.74 
 
Security Dilemma Revisited”, World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 
171–201; Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: a Concep-
tual Analysis”, Security Studies 18, no. 3 (2009): 587–623. 
71 On the following differentiations see Ken Booth and 
Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma. Fear, Cooperation and 
Trust in World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 
4–7. 
72 See Adam Mount, The Case against New Nuclear Weapons 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, May 2017), 
41. 
73 See Brad Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 
21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 173. 
74 See Susan Turner Haynes, “China’s Nuclear Threat Per-
ceptions”, Strategic Studies Quarterly 10, no. 2 (2016): 25–62. 
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China has rejected the first use of nuclear weapons 
in its declaratory nuclear doctrine; it is relying on a 
minimum deterrence strategy and thus on the ability 
to retaliate.75 Beijing fears that Washington’s develop-
ment of reconnaissance, surveillance and conven-
tional prompt global strike capabilities and missile 
defence systems could jeopardize China’s second 
strike capability. China maintains a relatively small 
nuclear arsenal and although there are no official 
figures, estimates suggest that China has around 290 
nuclear warheads.76 However, there are plans to ex-
pand this arsenal somewhat, which include acquiring 
a greater number of missiles with multiple warheads. 
The United States is faced with the question of whether 
to accept its nuclear vulnerability in relation to China, 
which may result from the deployment of mobile 
intercontinental and sea-based ballistic missiles, or 
whether it will pursue a damage limitation strategy 
that at least opens up the possibility of limiting its 
own losses, should deterrence fail. In accordance with 
the traditional logic of American deterrence policy, 
the United States would need options for pre-emptively 
eliminating the enemy’s nuclear arsenal.77 
According to fears voiced in the US debate, a secure 
Chinese second-strike capability could lead to a greater 
Chinese willingness to take risks in crises. In the 
debate on nuclear strategy, this is referred to as the 
“stability-instability paradox”.78 This means that 
stability at the strategic level could tempt one side 
to use limited force in the expectation that the other 
will shy away from a massive nuclear strike, as this 
would lead to mutual destruction. According to this 
scenario, a secure Chinese second-strike capability 
threatens to raise doubts among America’s Asian 
 
75 For more detail, see Eric Heginbotham et al., China’s 
Evolving Nuclear Deterrent. Major Drivers and Issues for the United 
States (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2017); David C. 
Logan, “Hard Constraints on a Chinese Nuclear Breakout”, 
The Nonproliferation Review 24, no. 1–2 (2017): 13–30; M. 
Taylor Fravel, Active Defense. China’s Military Strategy since 1949 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2019), 
236–69. 
76 See Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nu-
clear Forces, 2019”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 4 
(2019): 171–78. 
77 For more detail, see Peter Rudolf, US Nuclear Deterrence 
Policy and Its Problems, SWP Research Paper 10/2018 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2018), 14. 
78 See Bryan R. Early and Victor Asal, “Nuclear Weapons, 
Existential Threats, and the Stability-Instability Paradox”, 
The Nonproliferation Review 25, no. 3 (2018): 223–47. 
allies about the credibility of “extended deterrence”. 
If the United States follows the traditional line of its 
operational deterrence strategy – namely pursuing 
pre-emptive damage-limiting “counterforce” options 
as a prerequisite for credible extended deterrence79 – 
then the result will probably be an intensified arms 
competition.80 The US nuclear posture, which is 
geared to limiting damage in the event of war, must 
be perceived as threatening by China – irrespective 
of the defensive motives on the American side. 
In Sino-American relations the security dilemma 
also works in another form – namely via the Taiwan 
question. This unresolved sovereignty conflict carries 
the risk of war.81 The Chinese leadership expressly 
reserves the right to use military force in order to pre-
vent Taiwan’s complete independence, as President Xi 
Jinping once again emphasized very clearly in early 
January 2019.82 Once it had normalized relations with 
the People’s Republic of China in 1978, the United 
States ended official diplomatic ties with Taiwan and 
terminated the defence treaty. However, the Taiwan 
Relations Act of 1979 states that it is US policy to 
regard any attempt to decide Taiwan’s future other 
than by peaceful means as a threat to peace and secu-
 
79 Austin Long, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Targeting Policy: 
Necessity and Damage Limitation”, in The International 
Security Studies Forum, Policy Roundtable 1–4 on U.S. Nuclear 
Policy, 22 December 2016, https://networks.h-net.org/node/ 
28443/discussions/157862/issf-policy-roundtable-9-4-us-
nuclear-policy#_Toc470037165 (accessed 30 April 2018). 
80 See Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Should the 
United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. 
Nuclear Strategy toward China”, International Security 41, 
no. 1 (2016): 49–98; Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor 
Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear 
Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability”, International 
Security 40, no. 2 (2015): 7–50. 
81 See Scott L. Kastner, “Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash 
Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between 
China and Taiwan”, International Security 40, no. 3 (Winter 
2015/16): 54–92. 
82 See Chris Buckley and Chris Horton, “Xi Jinping Warns 
Taiwan that Unification Is the Goal and Force Is an Option”, 
The New York Times, 1 January 2019. – “China has the firm 
resolve and the ability to safeguard national sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, and will never allow the secession 
of any part of its territory by anyone, any organization or 
any political party by any means at any time. We make no 
promise to renounce the use of force, and reserve the option 
of taking all necessary measures.” China’s National Defense in 
the New Era (Beijing: The State Council Information Office of 
the People’s Republic of China, July 2019), 7f. 
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rity in the Western Pacific. Consequently, the US 
policy is one of “strategic ambiguity”; although it, 
promises to respond to any threat to Taiwan, it is not 
formally committed to doing so. For China, the goal 
of preventing Taiwan’s lasting independence from 
mainland China is a defensive one. Beijing wants to 
militarily deter Taiwan from changing the status quo 
and declaring independence. However, Chinese mili-
tary options might be perceived in an offensive sense, 
as enabling Beijing to compel reunification. The 
United States sees its security assurance to Taiwan 
and the supply of weapons systems to prevent an 
invasion by the People’s Republic of China as defen-
sively motivated. Nevertheless, defensively arming 
Taiwan and maintaining the ability of the United 
States to intervene in a crisis might be perceived by 
Beijing as a protective umbrella enabling Taiwan to 
declare independence.83 
From China’s point of view, the development of its 
own anti-access/area-denial capabilities in the South 
and East China Seas serves to safeguard “core inter-
ests”, including, first and foremost, preventing Tai-
wan from declaring independence. What China may 
see as defensively motivated, is perceived in the 
United States as developing offensive capabilities, 
which, if they do not deprive the US military of the 
capability to project power in the region, certainly 
make such a move more difficult and risky.84 China’s 
grand strategy, even under Xi Jinping, may basically 
be defensive. However, in an apparently threatening 
environment in which the Chinese leadership is un-
certain whether its power and the integrity of the 
state can be maintained in the long run, even a 
“defensive policy can look suspiciously aggressive”.85 
It is by no means easy for states to break out of the 
security dilemma. In order to assure the opponent of 
its own defensive intentions, steps are needed that 
may be considered too risky – certainly if the oppo-
nent’s present or future intentions are perceived as 
 
83 See Thomas J. Christensen, “The Contemporary Security 
Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict”, The Washington Quar-
terly 25, no. 4 (2002): 5–21. 
84 See James Johnson, The US-China Military and Defense Rela-
tionship during the Obama Presidency (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018), 97f. 
85 “The grand strategy it pursues is, at heart, defensive – 
and all the more implacable for that. And because it is a 
massive country, that defensive policy can look suspiciously 
aggressive.” Sulmaan Wasif Khan, Haunted by Chaos. China’s 
Grand Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping (Cambridge, MA, 
and London: Harvard University Press, 2018), 218. 
offensive.86 Security dilemmas between states can be 
mitigated by mutual transparency and confidence-
building measures and arms control.87 However, in 
the case of Sino-American relations, the sensitivity to 
possible security dilemmas seems to be limited by 
prevailing narratives that each side merely has defen-
sive intentions. It cannot be determined whether 
the Chinese leadership itself believes in the narrative 
it propagates. Dominant narratives, however, set 
parameters for each side’s own foreign policy and 
provide a framework for interpreting the perception 
of other actors. Officially, China sees itself as a power 
that was humiliated for a long time and that now 
aims to retake its position as a respected nation after 
the century of humiliation; as history has shown, it is 
a peacefully minded, non-aggressive, non-expansive 
country, whose rise has been hindered by the United 
States.88 The United States is equally unappreciative 
of the security dilemma. It sees itself predominantly 
as a liberal democracy that does not pose a threat to 
other states and, therefore, it should be in the inter-
ests of all well-meaning people that it guarantees in-
ternational stability with superior military strength.89 
The combination of defensive, peaceful self-images 
and the attribution of offensive and aggressive inten-
tions to the other side can trigger a conflict spiral.90 
 
86 In general on this problem, see Evan Braden Mont-
gomery, “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, 
Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty”, International 
Security 31, no. 2 (2006): 151–85. 
87 See Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, “Racing toward 
Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia 
Pacific, and the Security Dilemma”, International Security 39, 
no. 2 (2014): 52–91 (88ff.). 
88 See Merriden Varrall, Chinese Worldviews and China’s 
Foreign Policy (Sydney: Lowy Institute, November 2015); 
Andrew Scobell, “Learning to Rise Peacefully? China and the 
Security Dilemma”, Journal of Contemporary China 21, no. 76 
(2012): 713–21. 
89 See Christopher J. Fettweis, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, 
and the New Peace”, Security Studies 26, no. 3 (2017): 423–51 
(443ff.). 
90 In general on this, see Nicholas J. Wheeler, Trusting 
Enemies. Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 92f., 273f. On the 
“spiral model”, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception 
in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1976), 62–67. 
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The US-Chinese relationship can be interpreted as a 
complex “strategic rivalry”. Both countries are not 
only competitors for power and influence and sys-
temic antagonists, but also potential military oppo-
nents.91 The United States and China were already 
embroiled in a regional strategic rivalry during the 
Cold War. However, this ended when China broke 
ties with Moscow and Washington turned to China 
as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. The origin of 
today’s strategic rivalry can be traced back to the con-
frontation over Taiwan in 1996, when the possibility 
of a military confrontation came into focus.92 
Their intensifying strategic rivalry, rooted in in-
compatible goals and mutual threat perceptions, has 
a regional (Pacific Asia) dimension, a global dimen-
sion and a technological dimension to it. Competition 
for technological leadership is so pronounced because 
the introduction of new groundbreaking technologies 
creates economic growth and secures competitive 
advantages with military implications.93 And this is 
where the current situation is so completely different 
from the arms race with the Soviet Union: against a 
technologically backward opponent Washington was 
able to shift military competition to areas where the 
Soviet Union was weak. With China, the United States 
faces an opponent against whom this option does not 
exist, since China has caught up technologically and 
is even leading in some areas, such as quantum com-
puting and robotics. Maintaining or restoring tech-
 
91 See Manjeet S. Pardesi, Image Theory and the Initiation of 
Strategic Rivalries (Oxford: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of 
Politics, March 2017). 
92 See Elsa B. Kania, “Not a ‘New Era’ – Historical Memory 
and Continuities in U.S.-China Rivalry”, The Strategy Bridge, 
7 May 2019. 
93 See Timothy R. Heath and William R. Thompson, 
“Avoiding U.S.-China Competition Is Futile: Why the Best 
Option Is to Manage Strategic Rivalry”, Asia Policy 13, no. 2 
(2018): 91–119 (105ff.). 
nological leadership is of eminent military impor-
tance for the United States.94 
The Regional Dimension 
The US-Chinese conflict is more pronounced in the 
Western Pacific, especially in the South China Sea, 
than on the continental periphery of China.95 In 
“maritime Asia”, the relationship is antagonistic, im-
bued with military threat perceptions.96 In the United 
States, it is widely expected that China intends to 
establish an exclusive “maritime sphere of influence” 
in the South China Sea.97 China is expanding its mili-
tary options to counter US intervention capabilities 
on its periphery and to project its military power into 
the East Asian region and beyond. In conjunction 
with increased economic influence, this might enable 
China to “decouple” the United States from Asia, there-
by gaining supremacy in the region.98 In the United 
States, it is feared that China could use its growing 
economic clout and asymmetric economic relations 
to influence the security orientation of other states in 
 
94 See Robert O. Work and Greg Grant, Beating the Americans 
at Their Own Game. An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 
2019), 16. 
95 In detail, see Paul, Kriegsgefahr im Pazifik (see note 8), 
195–260. 
96 See Joel Wuthnow, “Asian Security without the United 
States? Examining China’s Security Strategy in Maritime and 
Continental Asia”, Asian Security 14, no. 3 (2018): 230–45. 
97 Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckon-
ing: How Beijing Defied American Expectations”, Foreign 
Affairs, 13 February 2018. 
98 Ashley J. Tellis, “Protecting American Primacy in the 
Indo-Pacific”, Testimony, Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee, Washington, D.C., 25 April 2017, https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tellis_04-25-17.pdf 
(accessed 16 April 2018). 
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the region, thereby undermining the US alliance sys-
tem. This concern tends to ignore the fact that the 
economies of the East Asian states (apart from North 
Korea) are globally integrated, thus limiting China’s 
ability to politically instrumentalize bilateral eco-
nomic relations.99 
In the Chinese discourse, the prevailing self-percep-
tion seems to be that China does not intend to exclude 
non-regional actors from the region as is often assumed 
in the United States. Chinese behavior in the South 
China Sea, however, can be taken as an indication 
that China is moving towards a policy of exclusion. 
Beijing has resolutely asserted legally questionable, 
historically founded territorial claims and established 
military outposts on artificial islands.100 In the South 
China Sea, China’s claims to some islands, rocks, reefs 
and low-tide elevations clash with those of four other 
littoral states (Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and 
Brunei). In addition, China’s sovereignty claims with-
in the “Nine-Dash Line” (an area that makes up most 
of the South China Sea) conflict with the Exclusive 
Economic Zones of these states and Indonesia. More-
over, China’s (as well as some other countries’) inter-
pretation of the Convention on the Law of the Sea is 
that states have the right to regulate and prohibit the 
military activities of other states in their Exclusive 
Economic Zones (which extend up to 200 nautical 
miles from the coast), an interpretation that the 
United States firmly rejects.101 
hina may not yet have a coherent strategy with 
regard to the South China Sea, at least not a “master 
 
99 “As China’s market power over Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Australia grew, each strengthened strategic cooperation with 
the US. US strategic superiority in maritime East Asia, rather 
than Chinese market power, determined their alignment 
preferences.” Robert S. Ross, “On the Fungibility of Economic 
Power: China’s Economic Rise and the East Asian Security 
Order”, European Journal of International Relations 25, no. 1 
(2019): 302–27 (318). 
100 See Steven F. Jackson, China’s Regional Relations in Com-
parative Perspective. From Harmonious Neighbors to Strategic Part-
ners (London: Routledge, 2018), 146–52; Denny Roy, “Asser-
tive China: Irredentism or Expansionism?” Survival 61, no. 1 
(2019): 51–74. 
101 In detail see Michael McDevitt, “Whither Sino-U.S. 
Relations: Maritime Disputes in the East and South China 
Seas?” in National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 
U.S.-China Relations: Manageable Differences or Major Crisis? 
(see note 40), 41–52; Ronald O’Rourke, U.S.-China Strategic 
Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues 
for Congress, CRS Report (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, 23 August 2019). 
plan” aimed at supremacy, as is often assumed by the 
Americans. The current policy can be interpreted as 
an “implicit strategy”, which, from China’s point of 
view, seeks to combine the defence of (however dubi-
ous) rights with the preservation of stability in the 
region. Yet, there seems to be a debate between pro-
ponents of competing approaches. Hardliners pro-
claim the necessity for Chinese control in this region, 
while pragmatists do not want to enforce Chinese 
sovereignty claims at the expense of regional instabil-
ity, and moderates see the need to garner support in 
the region.102 
Clash of incompatible positions in the 
South China Sea. 
In the South China Sea, there is a clash of incom-
patible positions under the law of the sea.103 Basically, 
it is a conflict between the US claim to freedom of the 
seas and the Chinese claim to a sphere of influence. 
The conflict is fed by the mutual perception that in a 
crisis the other side could block important maritime 
lines of communication in the South China Sea. If 
China were to block them, the economic costs would 
probably be bearable if shipping traffic to Australia, 
Japan or South Korea had to be diverted, for example 
via the Sunda or Lombok Passage. However, a large 
proportion of the goods shipped across the South 
China Sea come from China or go there. It is, there-
fore, in China’s interest to ensure maritime transport 
remains unhindered in the region. The Chinese fear 
that the US military could block the Strait of Malacca 
in the event of a crisis, thus severely affecting China’s 
energy supply.104 
 
102 See Feng Zhang, “Chinese Thinking on the South 
China Sea and the Future of Regional Security”, Political 
Science Quarterly 132, no. 3 (2017): 435–66; id., “China’s Long 
March at Sea: Explaining Beijing’s South China Sea Strategy, 
2009–2016”, The Pacific Review (online), 19 March 2019. 
103 See Huiyun Feng and Kai He, “The Bargaining Dilem-
ma between the United States and China in the South China 
Sea”, in US-China Competition and the South China Sea Disputes, ed. 
Huiyun Feng and Kai He (London: Routledge, 2018), 14–28. 
104 See James Laurenceson, “Economics and Freedom 
of Navigation in East Asia”, Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 71, no. 5 (2017): 461–73; Bobby Andersen and 
Charles M. Perry, Weighing the Consequences of China’s Control 
over the South China Sea (Cambridge, MA: The Institute for For-
eign Policy Analysis, November 2017), 12f.; Marc Lanteigne, 
“China’s Maritime Security and the ‘Malacca Dilemma’”, 
Asian Security 4, no. 2 (2008): 143–61. 
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The geopolitical conflict over the South China Sea 
also has a nuclear dimension to it.105 China seems 
to be fortifying the South China Sea as a protected 
bastion for ballistic missile submarines as part of a 
survivable second-strike capability. According to 
information from the United States, four ballistic 
missile submarines are already in service and more 
are in the planning stage.106 China still has no sea-
based ballistic missiles in service that, operating in 
the South China Sea, could reach not only Alaska 
and Guam but also the continental United States. 
It appears that they will be included in the next 
generation of strategic submarines.107 Due to the 
limited range of the sea-based nuclear missiles cur-
rently in service, in the event of a serious inter-
national crisis, China may try to relocate ballistic 
missile submarines to the deeper and thus safer 
waters of the Pacific, through the bottlenecks of the 
“first island chain” (which extends from the Kuril 
Islands via the Japanese islands and Taiwan to Bor-
neo). Securing the South China Sea against US anti-
submarine warfare forces is already an enormous 
challenge – the expansion of the artificial islands 
must also be seen in this context. The protection of 
strategic submarines on their way to the western 
Pacific probably requires more surface ships than 
China currently has in service.108 
While the East-West conflict was stabilized to a 
certain degree through the establishment of clear 
spheres of influence in Europe, the geostrategic 
situation in East Asia is a different, less stable one. 
There is no clear demarcation between spheres of 
influence and there are no respected buffer zones. 
China’s efforts to establish a kind of security zone 
within the first island chain amounts to a severe 
 
105 See Andrew Scobell, “The South China Sea and U.S.-
China Rivalry”, Political Science Quarterly 133, no. 2 (2018): 
199–224. 
106 See Michael Paul, Chinas nukleare Abschreckung. Ursachen, 
Mittel und Folgen der Stationierung chinesischer Nuklearwaffen auf 
Unterseebooten, SWP-Studie 17/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, September 2018); Tong Zhao, Tides of 
Change. China’s Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines and Strategic 
Stability (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace, 2018). 
107 A new ballistic missile with a range of about 9,000 km 
is being tested. See Kristensen and Korda, “Chinese Nuclear 
Forces, 2019” (see note 76), 175f. 
108 See The Impact of Chinese Supporting Capabilities (Beijing: 
Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 24 October 
2018). 
provocation of the United States as the leading sea 
power.109 
In this region, a worsening crisis between the 
United States and China poses a considerable risk to 
military instability. As US military planners assume, 
China will pursue offensive pre-emptive options in a 
crisis. At least, there are significant incentives for pre-
emptive action against US armed forces in the region, 
for example in the form of massive missile salvoes. US 
forces must therefore be able to withstand a surprise 
attack. How good Chinese offensive capabilities are 
remains somewhat uncertain. In order to shore up 
their deterrent, states – and this holds true for the 
United States as well – make some of their capabili-
ties transparent, but try to keep others hidden, so that 
the opponent remains uncertain. This uncertainty is a 
factor driving the arms race. For example, if the United 
States wants to remain militarily “competitive” with 
China in respect of a regional conflict, it must expand 
its capabilities to destroy Chinese systems with long-
range weapons, especially cruise missiles.110 Since the 
termination of the INF Treaty Washington has been 
free to deploy medium-range systems in Asia. It could 
base them on the island of Guam, which belongs to 
the United States, or – should its allies agree – in 
the north of Japan, the southern Philippines or in 
the northern part of Australia. With conventionally 
equipped medium-range systems, the US military 
could destroy Chinese forces in the South China and 
East China Seas without sending naval units into 
these risk zones. This would also obviate the need 
to initially eliminate missile systems on the Chinese 
mainland that would endanger US surface ships. Such 
an attack could inadvertently neutralize Chinese 
nuclear forces or their command and control facilities 
since, according to available information, China’s 
conventional and nuclear forces seem to be entangled. 
It cannot be ruled out that, in the event of a serious 
confrontation, China will be tempted to use nuclear 
weapons before they are put out of action.111 
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The Global Dimension 
The Trump administration sees China’s growing 
worldwide political and economic presence in the 
sense of a zero-sum game. If China is to gain in-
fluence globally, it will be at the expense of the 
United States. In particular, China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) has been viewed with some suspicion. 
The BRI and the establishment of the Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank (AIIB) have served to com-
bine economic and geopolitical goals. China opens up 
new markets to make use of industrial overcapacities; 
it builds new road and rail networks to reduce the 
dependence on vulnerable sea lanes. And in this pro-
cess it is widening its economic leverage and shoring 
up its position in the global power competition.112 
Initially, the Trump administration’s response to 
the initiative was rather restrained and it even sent 
a representative to the first BRI Forum in 2017. How-
ever, the US position soon hardened. Washington 
warned against China’s “debt trap diplomacy” aimed 
at extending its political influence. The case of Sri 
Lanka has been repeatedly cited as an example. In 
December 2017, China took over the port that had 
been built there with Chinese loans, but which the 
Sri Lankan government was unable to repay.113 The 
fact that on closer analysis this case is the exception 
rather than the rule is largely ignored in the US cam-
paign to prevent countries from participating in 
BRI projects.114 
 
escalation, see James M. Acton, “Escalation through Entan-
glement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-control 
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International Security 43, no. 1 (2018): 56–99; Caitlin Tal-
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Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the 
United States”, International Security 41, no. 4 (2017): 50–92. 
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China 27, no. 114 (2018): 831–47; Hanns Günther Hilpert 
and Gudrun Wacker, Geoökonomie trifft Geopolitik. Chinas neue 
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52/2015 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 
2015). 
113 See Nectar Gan and Robert Delaney, “United States 
under Donald Trump Is Veering Away from China’s Belt and 
Road”, South China Morning Post, 25 April 2019. 
114 See Agatha Kratz, Allen Feng and Logan Wright, “New 
Data on the ‘Debt Trap’ Question”, Rhodium Group, 29 April 
2019. 
The Trump administration has promoted the idea 
of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as a kind of 
counter-narrative to the BRI. As has been aptly argued, 
this is a “strategic narrative”, a narrative with the aim 
of promoting one’s own interests. Narratives reduce 
complexity and also serve to mobilize domestic and 
international support. At the international level, the 
narrative contrasts the rules-based international order 
with an order shaped by China; at the national level, 
it signals the antithesis of democracy and autocracy; 
at the thematic level, it marks the difference between 
a defensive policy aimed at maintaining the status 
quo and an expansive revisionist one.115 
In October 2018, the International Development 
Finance Corporation (IDFC) was signed into law in 
order to keep pace with China’s global money flows. 
It is intended to support and secure US foreign invest-
ment. Its aim, as the law states, is to provide “a robust 
alternative to state-directed investments by authori-
tarian governments”. This new organization, which 
began operations in December 2019, takes over and 
expands tasks previously performed by the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and parts of 
the US Agency for International Development (USAID). 
The IDFC’s expected financial volume of $60 billion 
remains well below China’s BRI investment – esti-
mated by some to be approximately $340 billion 
between 2014 and 2017.116 
The United States is trying to 
dissuade other countries from 
further developing economic ties 
with China. 
The United States is trying to dissuade other coun-
tries from further developing economic ties with 
China. Washington has warned Israel against partici-
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116 See Daniel Kliman, To Compete with China, Get the New 
U.S. Development Finance Corporation Right (Washington, D.C.: 
Center for a New American Security, February 2019); 
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pating in infrastructure projects with China. Particu-
larly worrisome is the prospect that the state-owned 
Shanghai International Port Group will operate the 
port of Haifa.117 Washington is no less concerned 
about the UK’s cooperation with the Chinese nuclear 
company China General Nuclear, which, according 
to the United States, transfers technology for military 
use.118 During his visit to Panama, Secretary of State 
Michael Pompeo warned the country’s president 
against expanding economic relations with China. 
Washington is apparently concerned that Panama 
could become a “bridgehead” for China’s growing 
economic influence in the Western hemisphere. 
China, whose ships are heavily reliant on the Panama 
Canal, is involved in several infrastructure projects in 
Panama. The United States began to focus on China’s 
role there when the Panamanian government an-
nounced in June 2017 that it would break off diplo-
matic relations with Taiwan. The Dominican Republic 
and El Salvador followed suit shortly thereafter.119 
In response to pressure from Washington, the 
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) 
contains a passage aimed at China. The contracting 
parties are required to inform each other at least 
three months prior to commencing negotiations with 
a “non-market economy” and to provide as much 
information as possible about the objectives of these 
negotiations. If one of the parties enters into a free 
trade agreement with a non-market economy, the 
other parties to the USMCA are free to terminate the 
agreement with six months’ notice and replace it 
with a bilateral agreement, in effect excluding the 
party that enters into a free trade agreement with 
a non-market economy. In purely legal terms, this 
clause may have little meaning in practice and may 
be regarded as symbolic, as sending a signal; the 
USMCA can be terminated by either party with six 
months’ notice anyway. This clause, however, legiti-
 
117 See William A. Galston, “What’s Beijing Doing in 
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Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S.-China Economic and Security 
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mizes a potential US response that could otherwise 
be perceived as a unilateral use of economic pressure. 
The US administration aims to include a similar trans-
parency mechanism in free trade agreements with 
other states.120 
Africa is regarded as the “new front” in the Sino-
American struggle for influence. From the Trump 
administration’s point of view, Beijing is trying to 
make African countries submissive to Chinese inter-
ests through loans, bribery and dubious agreements. 
Introducing the “new Africa strategy” in December 
2018, then security advisor John Bolton warned 
against China’s “predatory” practices in Africa.121 
Shortly before leaving office, UN Ambassador Nikki 
Haley tried to prevent a Chinese diplomat from being 
appointed UN Special Ambassador for the Great Lakes 
(in Africa). There may have been some concern that 
the Chinese could use his specific UN role to expand 
Chinese influence in the region. But there is also 
general concern about China’s growing clout within 
the UN. China wants to place its own diplomats in UN 
leadership positions. In addition, Beijing has consider-
ably expanded its participation in UN peace missions, 
both financially and in terms of personnel. As a result, 
the United States has begun to scrutinize Chinese in-
fluence in the UN and in other international organi-
zations.122 
Washington also sees the Arctic as a new arena for 
great power rivalry. Its focus is not only on Russia, 
but meanwhile also on China, which sees itself as a 
“Near-Arctic State”. The Pentagon’s most recent an-
nual report on Chinese military power, published in 
April 2019, contains a section on the Arctic. In it, the 
Department of Defense warns against China’s grow-
ing presence in the region, including the possibility 
that China could deploy nuclear submarines there.123 
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One month later, Secretary of State Pompeo warned 
the Arctic Council against China’s “aggressive behav-
iour” in the region.124 
The United States has been responding to China’s 
growing interest in the region, as articulated in the 
Chinese government’s Arctic policy from January 
2018 and numerous other activities.125 According 
to Secretary of State Pompeo, China invested almost 
$90 billion in the Arctic between 2012 and 2017. Due 
to climate change and melting polar ice, the region 
has become interesting for China. Not only does 
the northern sea route shorten the distance between 
China and Europe considerably, China is also inter-
ested in exploiting Arctic energy resources. A 2008 US 
Geological Survey estimated that around 13 percent 
of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves and around 
30 percent of the world’s undiscovered gas reserves 
are located in the Arctic. In summer 2018, the first 
deliveries of liquefied gas from the Yamal Peninsula 
in Russia were shipped via the northern route.126 
China is not only investing in Russia, but also in 
other Arctic countries, such as Iceland and Greenland 
(which belongs to Denmark). The purchase of a for-
mer US naval base in Greenland and plans to expand 
an airport failed, however, because the Danish gov-
ernment objected to the airport project, following 
an intervention by the then US Secretary of Defense 
James Mattis.127 
The United States views China’s 
presence in the Arctic as a 
security threat. 
The United States views China’s presence in the 
Arctic as a security threat. The Pentagon’s report on 
its Arctic strategy published in June 2019 sees the 
region as a “potential vector for an attack on the U.S. 
 
against nuclear attacks.” Department of Defense, Annual 
Report to Congress. Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People’s Republic of China 2019 (Washington, D.C., May 2019), 
114. 
124 Michael R. Pompeo, “Looking North: Sharpening 
America’s Arctic Focus”, Remarks, Rovaniemi, 6 May 2019, 
https://ee.usembassy.gov/americas-arctic-focus/ (accessed 
16 July 2019). 
125 Ibid. 
126 See Steven Lee Myers and Somini Sengupta, “Latest 
Arena for China’s Growing Global Ambitions: The Arctic”, 
The New York Times, 27 May 2019. 
127 See David Auerswald, “China’s Multifaceted Arctic 
Strategy”, War on the Rocks, 24 May 2019. 
homeland”.128 The deployment of ballistic missile 
submarines in the Arctic would have two advantages 
for China. Firstly, if Chinese strategic submarines 
were able to operate under the ice, this would prob-
ably reduce their vulnerability to American anti-sub-
marine warfare. Secondly, the flight time to targets in 
the continental United States would be considerably 
shorter than from launching areas in the Pacific. 
However, these scenarios are not likely to occur in the 
short-term and remain speculative for the time being. 
Chinese submarines would likely require a developed 
infrastructure in Arctic Russia.129 Nevertheless, US 
military planners appear to be reckoning with this in 
their worst-case assumptions. Although China’s White 
Paper on Arctic Policy does not explicitly mention 
military aspects, the strategic importance of the Arctic 
is an important topic in Chinese military discourse.130 
The Technological Dimension 
The Sino-American conflict has a pronounced techno-
logical dimension; it is a kind of struggle for techno-
logical supremacy in the digital age.131 For the Chinese 
leadership, it is a matter of “catching up and sur-
passing” the West in the field of advanced technology. 
From this point of view, the technological superiority 
of the West has secured its global dominance.132 The 
United States under Trump wants to weaken China 
economically and technologically. It is no coinci-
dence, therefore, that Huawei is at the centre of the 
dispute, one of China’s most important technology 
groups, accused of stealing company secrets in the 
United States, circumventing Iranian sanctions and 
obstructing a police investigation. Michael Pillsbury 
of the Hudson Institute, an advisor to the Trump ad-
 
128 Department of Defense, Report to Congress Department 
of Defense Arctic Strategy (Washington, D.C., June 2019), 6. 
129 See Lyle J. Goldstein, “Chinese Nuclear Armed Sub-
marines in Russian Arctic Ports? It Could Happen”, The 
National Interest, 6 June 2019. 
130 See David Curtis Wright, The Dragon and Great Power 
Rivalry at the Top of the World: China’s Hawkish, Revisionist Voices 
with Mainstream Discourse on Arctic Affairs (Calgary: Canadian 
Global Affairs Institute, September 2018). 
131 See James A. Lewis, Technological Competition and China 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, November 2018). 
132 See Julian Baird Gewirtz, “China’s Long March to Tech-
nological Supremacy. The Roots of Xi Jinping’s Ambition to 
‘Catch up and Surpass’”, Foreign Affairs, 27 August 2019. 
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ministration, summed it up as follows, “The Ameri-
cans are not going to surrender global technological 
supremacy without a fight, and the indictment of 
Huawei is the opening shot in that struggle”.133 In the 
Trump administration’s view, the conflict with Hua-
wei is about who controls the information systems in 
future 5G networks. This is seen as a zero-sum game. 
Accordingly, the administration is actively pursuing 
its worldwide campaign to persuade states to refrain 
from using Chinese technology.134 
In May 2019, Huawei was effectively cut off from 
American supplies. Firstly, the US Department of 
Commerce put the company on its so-called “Entity 
List”. US and foreign companies supplying Huawei 
with US components above a certain threshold must 
apply for approval. Under this procedure, licences are 
generally denied unless there are compelling reasons 
to grant one. In 2018, 33 of Huawei’s 92 most impor-
tant suppliers came from the United States. The sec-
ond restriction, which not only affects Huawei, took 
the form of an executive order signed by President 
Trump. It prohibits US companies from conducting 
transactions for information and communication 
technologies (the definition of which is very broad) if 
these are designed, developed, manufactured or sup-
plied by persons (meaning not only individuals, but 
also organizations and firms) “owned by, controlled 
by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a 
foreign adversary” and these transactions pose un-
acceptable national security risks.135 
President Trump may have taken this step simply 
to increase pressure on China in trade negotiations. 
 
133 Quoted in David E. Sanger, Katie Benner and Matthew 
Goldstein, “Huawei and Top Executive Face Criminal Charges 
in the U.S.”, The New York Times, 28 January 2019. As Pillsbury 
argues, China had already drawn up a plan in 1950 to re-
place the United States as a global superpower within 100 
years. See his book The Hundred-Year Marathon. China’s Secret 
Strategy to Replace the United States as the Global Superpower (New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, 2015). For a critical review, 
see Alastair Iain Johnston, “Shaky Foundations: The ‘Intellec-
tual Architecture’ of Trump’s China Policy”, Survival 61, no. 2 
(2019): 189–202. 
134 See David E. Sanger et al., “U.S. Scrambles to Outrun 
China in New Arms Race”, The New York Times, 27 January 
2019. 
135 See Charles Rollet, “Huawei Ban Means the End of 
Global Tech”, Foreign Policy, 17 May 2019; The White House, 
Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications 
Technology and Services Supply Chain (Washington, D.C., 15 May 
2019). 
Fixated on the trade deficit and interested in a deal 
with China, Trump announced a relaxation of the 
supply ban on Huawei after meeting Chinese Presi-
dent Xi Jinping at the end of June 2019 in Osaka. 
Intensive lobbying by the US semiconductor industry 
had not gone unnoticed by the Trump administration. 
These firms, reacting to Beijing’s hint that China, too, 
would set up a list of unreliable suppliers, were con-
cerned they would lose access to the Chinese market.136 
There seems to be no consensus in the administra-
tion about the goals being pursued by placing eco-
nomic pressure on China, particularly through trade 
sanctions. Three different approaches can be distin-
guished. Some in the administration want to achieve 
a restructuring of the Chinese economy because the 
strong role of state-owned corporations in industrial 
policy and the resulting distortions of competition 
have long been a constant annoyance. Others are will-
ing to make a deal if the Chinese economy is opened 
up more to US investment, exports and services. Still 
others have in mind to decouple the two economies.137 
For these “China hawks” in the administration – 
namely Peter Navarro, Trump’s advisor on trade 
issues and director of the Office of Trade and Manu-
facturing Policy in the White House – the fight 
against Huawei is an important stage in the compe-
tition for future technological supremacy.138 By 
decoupling the two economies as much as possible 
they hope to reduce US economic and technological 
vulnerability, and thus also the security vulnerability 
that has resulted from interdependence.139 For them, 
China is a serious threat to the industrial foundations 
of the United States. They see economic and national 
security as inseparable.140 
Accordingly, the Interagency Task Force set up by 
President Trump to strengthen the US industrial base 
 
136 See Jenny Leonard and Ian King, “Why Trump Eased 
Huawei Tech Ban. U.S. Chipmakers Said It Could Hurt Econo-
my and National Security”, Los Angeles Times, 3 July 2019. 
137 For this differentiation, see David Dollar, Ryan Hass 
and Jeffrey A. Bader, “Assessing U.S.-China Relations 2 
Years into the Trump Presidency”, Order from Chaos (Blog, 
The Brookings Institution, 15 January 2019). 
138 See Richard Waters, Kathrin Hille and Louise Lucas, 
“Trump Risks a Tech Cold War”, Financial Times, 25 May 2019. 
139 See Uri Friedman, “Donald Trump’s Real Endgame 
with China”, The Atlantic, 4 October 2018; Michael Hirsh, 
“Trump’s Economic Iron Curtain against China”, Foreign 
Policy, 23 August 2019. 
140 Peter Navarro, “Our Economic Security at Risk”, 
The New York Times, 5 October 2018. 
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and the resilience of supply chains took a very close 
look at China. The Task Force identified Chinese in-
dustrial and trade policy as one of five macro factors 
that are seen as endangering the US industrial base 
and its capacity for innovation – and thus jeopard-
izing the preconditions for military dominance.141 
China also poses “a significant and growing risk to 
the supply of materials and technologies deemed 
strategic and critical to U.S. national security”.142 
These include special metals, including rare earth 
elements. Moreover, according to this analysis, China 
is the sole source or main supplier of a number of 
“critical energetic materials used in munitions and 
missiles”.143 The considerable role that rare earth 
metals play in many weapons systems and China’s 
dominant role in the market are problems that the 
Pentagon has been tackling for years without ever 
finding a satisfactory solution. With China hinting 
at possibly using export restrictions on such metals 
as a lever in the trade dispute, this issue has received 
renewed public attention.144 
Technological competition is not only about the 
consequences for security policy, but also for the 
labour market – should China implement its ambi-
tious projects as formulated in “Made in China 2025”. 
This plan, adopted in May 2015 by the State Council, 
the highest state body, is part of a series of pro-
grammes to modernize the Chinese economy, with 
the aim of avoiding the so-called “middle income 
trap” and making the transition to a “high-income 
economy” by inventing own products and moving the 
 
141 “China’s non-market distortions to the economic 
playing field must end or the U.S. will risk losing the tech-
nology overmatch and industrial capabilities that have 
enabled and empowered our military dominance”. Depart-
ment of Defense, Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing 
and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United 
States. Report to President Donald J. Trump by the Interagency Task 
Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806 (Washington, D.C., 
September 2018), 36. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid., 37. 
144 See Keith Johnson and Lara Seligman, “How China 
Could Shut Down America’s Defenses”, Foreign Policy, 11 June 
2019. China’s near-monopoly in this area was first widely 
perceived as a problem when Beijing “unofficially” stopped 
the export of rare earth metals to Japan in September 2010. 
This was Beijing’s reaction to a maritime incident in the 
waters around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, to which both 
China and Japan have territorial claims. On this and the 
broader problem, see Sophia Kalantzakos, China and the Geo-
politics of Rare Earths (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
Chinese economy up the value chain. “Made in China 
2025” is the first step in this process of innovation, 
followed by breakthroughs in important areas by 
2035. By 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founda-
tion of the People’s Republic of China, the country ex-
pects to have become the leading industrial nation.145 
All this is to be achieved with the support of Ameri-
can companies as well, for example in aircraft con-
struction: at least ten American companies are taking 
part in joint ventures to develop the C 919 aircraft, 
which would make China a competitor to Boeing and 
Airbus on the global market for passenger aircraft.146 
From the perspective of the US economy, “Made in 
China 2025” aims to change the dynamics of global 
markets in core sectors. The ultimate goal of China’s 
industrial policy is to develop not only “national” but 
also “global champions” i.e. companies that are world 
leaders in their industrial sectors.147 
Growing Chinese competition is likely to lead to 
further job losses in the United States. While jobs in 
manufacturing, in particular, have so far fallen victim 
to competition from China, Chinese practices such as 
theft of intellectual property and forced technology 
transfer are now threatening the higher segment 
of the US economy in the services and high-tech sec-
tors.148 In the two decades following the establish-
ment of economic relations in 1979, when the United 
States and China signed a bilateral trade agreement, 
 
145 See Wayne M. Morrison, The Made in China 2025 Initia-
tive: Economic Implications for the United States, In Focus (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 29 August 2018). 
146 See U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship, Made in China 2025 and the Future of Ameri-
can Industry (Washington, D.C., 2019). 
147 See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Made in China 2025: 
Global Ambitions Built on Local Protections (Washington, D.C., 
2017). It is not without irony that, in the individualistic 
capitalist US, the model of a state-controlled Chinese economy 
is regarded as a serious economic threat and even its future 
superiority feared, but its structural problems are overlooked 
(limited competition inhibits innovation, huge state-owned 
companies undermine market mechanisms, state subsidies 
lead to financial risks). In a way, this is reminiscent of the 
“paranoia” of the 1980s when Japan was seen as the great 
challenge. William H. Overholt, “Myths and Misconceptions 
in U.S.-China Relations”, in National Committee on Ameri-
can Foreign Policy, U.S.-China Relations (see note 40), 19–30 
(26). 
148 See Joshua P. Meltzer and Neena Shenai, The US-China 
Economic Relationship: a Comprehensive Approach, Policy Brief 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution/American 
Enterprise Institute, February 2019). 
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America mainly imported labour-intensive products 
of low value. Today, around one third of imports 
from China are advanced technology products. Grow-
ing Chinese imports led to job losses in the United 
States,149 although the extent of these losses is contro-
versial. According to a study by the National Bureau 
of Economic Research, imports from China between 
1999 and 2011 directly or indirectly led to the loss of 
2 to 2.4 million jobs in the manufacturing industry. 
That would be around ten percent of the industrial 
jobs lost during this period. In other studies, produc-
tivity gains are more likely to be held responsible for 
job losses. US exports to China, however, also secure 
an estimated 1.8 million jobs in the United States – 
not to mention the benefits that US consumers derive 
from importing cheap products manufactured in 
China.150 
What is becoming apparent in the 
campaign against Huawei is the turn 
away from the positive-sum logic in 
economic relations with China. 
What is becoming apparent in the campaign 
against Huawei is the abandonment of the positive-
sum logic in economic relations with China. As long 
as Washington did not fear the rise of a strategic 
rival, economic logic prevailed. In absolute terms, the 
United States benefited from economic exchange rela-
tions. It played no significant role that China might 
have benefited relatively more from this. This eco-
nomic logic, which was based on absolute gains, was 
 
149 As American-Chinese economic contacts intensified, 
economic issues replaced human rights issues as the most 
controversial topic in the US Congress. Time and again, legis-
lative initiatives were launched which expressed dissatis-
faction with Chinese currency manipulation, the theft of 
intellectual property and violations of WTO rules. These 
initiatives were, to a large extent, reactions to the loss of 
American jobs in the manufacturing sector. Thus the authors 
of a study come to the following conclusion: “After 2003, the 
greater the impact of Chinese imports on a given district, 
the more likely that district’s legislator would vote for nega-
tive legislation pertaining to China.” John Seungmin Kuk, 
Deborah Seligsohn and Jiakun Jack Zhang, “From Tianan-
men to Outsourcing: the Effect of Rising Import Competition 
on Congressional Voting Towards China”, Journal of Contem-
porary China 27, no. 109 (2018): 103–19 (117). 
150 See Wayne M. Morrison, China-U.S. Trade Issues, CRS 
Report (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 
30 July 2018), 7, 15ff. 
linked to the expectation that economic interdepend-
ence would promote political cooperation and stabi-
lize peace.151 
With China seen as a global strategic rival, the eco-
nomic logic has given way to a security-policy logic 
with its dominant concern being the relative distribu-
tion of gains152 and the negative consequences of eco-
nomic interdependence for preserving the technologi-
cal basis of military superiority. America wants to 
maintain its technological superiority over China, 
which is favourably positioned in the transition to 
the “fourth industrial revolution”, in which artificial 
intelligence plays an important role. China, on the 
other hand, is determined to close the technological 
gap and it aims to do so through industrial policy 
initiatives that are part of the Made in China 2025 
framework, economic transactions focussing on tech-
nology transfer and industrial espionage. Clearly, a 
number of President Trump’s initiatives are aimed 
at impeding China’s technological progress. Above 
all, the US technological base must be protected: 
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States is examining Chinese investments in the United 
States more closely and restricting them. The Foreign 
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 
extends the scope of the review to include “critical 
technology”. What this involves is not yet clear. The 
list also includes so-called “emerging and foundation-
al technologies”, which have yet to be determined in 
the reformed export control process.153 
In addition, Washington is taking targeted meas-
ures to slow down technological innovation in China: 
economic transactions with Chinese companies are 
to be restricted and export controls tightened. The 
Export Control Reform Act, which came into force 
in August 2018, authorizes export restrictions on 
“emerging and foundational” technologies that are 
considered essential for US national security but are 
not subject to existing controls. A permanent inter-
 
151 On this and the following Anthea Roberts, Henrique 
Choer Moraes and Victor Ferguson, Toward a Geoeconomic 
Order in International Trade and Investment, Draft Version, SSRN, 
20 September 2019, 4ff., https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=3389163 (accessed 24 September 2019). 
152 In general on the relationship between security and 
relative gains, see Peter Liberman, “Trading with the Enemy: 
Security and Relative Economic Gains”, International Security 
21, no. 1 (1996): 147–75. 
153 See James K. Jackson, The Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the United States (CFIUS), CRS Report (Washington, D.C.: Con-
gressional Research Service, 6 August 2019), 24f. 
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agency coordination process serves to identify such 
technologies. Among the technologies that the 
Bureau of Industry and Security in the Department of 
Commerce, which is responsible for this process, has 
in mind are those that are central to Made in China 
2025, including biotech, artificial intelligence and 
quantum computing.154 There are also efforts under-
way to reduce the transfer of knowledge by Chinese 
students and scientists in the United States. This 
includes restrictions on granting visas to Chinese 
students who are involved in research that is con-
sidered sensitive. Chinese scientists who, in the 
opinion of the FBI, maintain relations with Chinese 
intelligence services will be denied visas.155 
The rivalry between the United States 
and China could lead to the 
emergence of a new “geoeconomic 
world order”. 
All these defensive and offensive measures might 
lead the Chinese to seek to reduce its dependence on 
the United States and those states that are integrated 
into the US strategy of denying China access to ad-
vanced technology. The rivalry between the United 
States and China could lead to the emergence of a 
new “geoeconomic world order”, in which the ques-
tion of the relative distribution of gains and the con-
cern about the security consequences of economic 
interdependence play a far more important role than 
in recent decades.156 If economic and security inter-
 
154 For more details, see Peter Lichtenbaum, Victor Ban 
and Lisa Ann Johnson, “Defining ‘Emerging Technologies’: 
Industry Weighs in on Potential New Export Controls”, China 
Business Review, 17 April 2019; Kevin Wolf, “Confronting 
Threats from China: Assessing Controls on Technology and 
Investment”, Testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 4 June 2019, https:// 
www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wolf%20Testimony
%206-4-19.pdf (accessed August 23, 2019). 
155 See Jane Perlez, “F.B.I. Bars Some China Scholars From 
Visiting U.S. over Spying Fears”, The New York Times, 14 April 
2019. 
156 Such a geoeconomic world order would be character-
ized “by a higher degree of convergence between security 
and economics; a greater focus on relative economic gains 
given their implications for security; and increased concern 
over the security risks posed by interdependence in terms of 
undermining state control, self-sufficiency and resilience”. 
Anthea Roberts, Henrique Choer Moraes and Victor Fergu-
son, “The Geoeconomic World Order”, Lawfare (Blog), 19 No-
vember 2018. 
ests are adjusted in this manner, it could lead to a 
reduction in the level of global economic integration, 
a kind of de-globalization. 
If developments were to move in this direction, it 
would not be too surprising. Historical experience 
shows that strategic rivalries tend to have an impact 
on economic relations.157 This effect depends not only 
directly on state restrictions, such as export and in-
vestment controls, but also indirectly on decisions 
by economic actors that reflect the deterioration of 
political relations in their behaviour. US companies 
are already relocating their production and postpon-
ing investment decisions. In August 2019, President 
Trump further fuelled uncertainty about the future 
of American-Chinese economic relations by calling on 
US firms to look for production sites outside China.158 
Despite a cease-fire in January 2020 (the so-called 
phase-one agreement), the trade dispute remains un-
resolved and considerably increased US tariffs affect 
a wide range of imports from China. 
 
157 The authors of a study on this problem conclude, “that 
rivalry reduces the volume of bilateral trade between two 
countries, and that this trade-suppressing effect is stronger 
among pairs of countries with similar national power”. 
Johann Park and Chungshik Moon, “Interstate Rivalry and 
Interstate Trade”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 11, 
no. 3 (2018): 271–96 (294). 
158 See David J. Lynch, “U.S.-China Dispute Shakes Firms’ 
Plans”, The Washington Post, 14 February 2019; Keith Bradsher, 
“One Trump Victory: Companies Rethink China”, The New 
York Times, 5 April 2019; Ana Swanson, “As Trump Escalates 
Trade War, U.S. and China Move Further Apart with No End 
in Sight”, The New York Times, 1 September 2019; Chad P. 
Bown, US-China Trade War: The Guns of August (Washington, 
D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 17 Sep-
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The strategic rivalry between the United States and 
China contains the ingredients to solidify into a 
“structural world conflict”159 with the potential for 
economic and military risks. This conflict not only 
has a subjective dimension because the actors in-
volved perceive it from this perspective, but also an 
objective one because it has started to shape the struc-
ture of international politics. Europe cannot signifi-
cantly influence the Sino-American world conflict. 
However, its consequences might be dramatic if the 
economic interdependence between the United States 
and China dissolved, economic blocs or closed eco-
nomic spaces emerged and a process of economic de-
globalization began.160 If the American-Chinese con-
flict continues to escalate and leads to a bipolariza-
tion of the international system, the basis for global 
multilateralism may also dwindle.161 
Strategic Rivalry instead of 
Geopolitical Accommodation 
Since American-Chinese strategic rivalry is about 
regional and global leadership, at least from the pre-
vailing American point of view, only its intensity and 
risks can be mitigated.162 The Chinese expert and elite 
discourse also seems to be dominated by the view that 
the strategic rivalry with the United States is likely to 
be intense and long-lasting and conflict management 
 
159 On “structural world conflicts”, see Link, Ost-West-
Konflikt (see note 43), 35–53. 
160 See David A. Lake, Economic Openness and Great Power 
Competition: Lessons for China and the United States, 21st Century 
China Center Research Paper no. 2018-01 (San Diego: Uni-
versity of California San Diego School of Global Policy and 
Strategy, April 2018). 
161 From a Chinese perspective, see Yan Xuetong, “The 
Age of Uneasy Peace: Chinese Power in a Divided World”, 
Foreign Affairs, 11 December 2018; in addition, see Ngaire 
Woods, “Can Multilateralism Survive the Sino-American 
Rivalry?” The Strategist, 10 July 2019. 
162 See Heath and Thompson, “Avoiding U.S.-China Com-
petition Is Futile” (see note 93), 115–19. 
is needed to reduce the risks.163 But this is anything 
but easy. Mutual “strategic distrust”164 over the goals 
of the other side runs deep, there is a lack of willing-
ness to reach a strategic understanding and strong 
traditional interests leave little room for mutually 
acceptable geopolitical compromises. In both the Chi-
nese and American debates, there are occasionally 
proposals for a kind of “grand bargain”. One proposal 
voiced in the US discourse is to end the commitment 
to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression – in ex-
change for a commitment by the Chinese to settle the 
maritime and territorial disputes in the South and 
East China Seas peacefully and to accept America’s 
traditional security role in East Asia.165 Conversely, in 
China it has been proposed that Washington should 
recognize China’s leading position in Asia based on 
its growing economic importance and allow China 
“strategic space” in parts of the Western Pacific – in 
return China would accept US global military superi-
ority and predominant influence in other world 
regions. Proposals of this kind have at best the pros-
pect of becoming politically effective if at least one 
 
163 See Minghao Zhao, “Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chi-
nese Perspectives on US-China Strategic Competition”, The 
Chinese Journal of International Politics 12, no. 3 (2019): 371–94. 
164 On the lack of trust, see Gregory J. Moore, “Avoiding 
a Thucydides Trap in Sino-American Relations (… and 7 
Reasons Why that Might Be Difficult)”, Asian Security 13, 
no. 2 (2017): 98–115 (99f.). On the necessity, but also on 
the problems, of a Chinese policy of “strategic reassurance”, 
which would have to create confidence that China’s present 
and – even more difficult – future intentions do not aim 
at establishing an exclusive sphere of influence in Asia, see 
Reinhard Wolf, “Rising Powers, Status Ambitions, and the 
Need to Reassure: What China Could Learn from Imperial 
Germany’s Failures”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 
7, no. 2 (2014): 185–219. 
165 See Charles L. Glaser, “A U.S.–China Grand Bargain? 
The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accom-
modation”, International Security 39, no. 4 (2015): 49–90. 
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of the two antagonists were to reassess its own core 
interests.166 
For the United States, it can be said with some 
certainty that a geopolitical accommodation along 
these lines is incompatible with the traditional per-
ception of its interests and the claim to primacy.167 
Occasionally the question is asked whether China’s 
supremacy in East Asia, which is similar to that of 
the United States in Latin America, could perhaps be 
reconciled with American interests.168 The United 
States, however, still sees itself as the power whose 
leading role in the Indo-Pacific region is indispen-
sable. The US Congress reaffirmed this understanding 
with the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018, 
adopted in December 2018. This legislative initiative 
is largely symbolic as an expression of support for 
President Trump’s competitive approach to China.169 
Rivalry with China as Organizing 
Principle of US Foreign Policy? 
On China policy, Congress has supported and re-
inforced rather than moderated the administration’s 
hard line. This applies to both Republicans and Demo-
crats.170 Congressional initiatives reflect a change in 
sentiment towards China. Assertiveness in the South 
 
166 See Evelyn Goh, “The Prospects for a Great Power 
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167 See Steven Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising 
Powers (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 
190–94. 
168 Paul Heer, “Rethinking U.S. Primacy in East Asia”, 
The National Interest, 8 January 2019. 
169 “Without strong leadership from the United States, the 
international system, fundamentally rooted in the rule of 
law, may wither, to the detriment of United States, regional, 
and global interests. It is imperative that the United States 
continue to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region 
by– (A) defending peace and security; (B) advancing eco-
nomic prosperity; and (C) promoting respect for fundamental 
human rights.” https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ409/ 
PLAW-115publ409.pdf. See Michael F. Martin et al., The Asia 
Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) of 2018, In Focus (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 4 April 2019). 
170 See Robert Sutter, “Congress and Trump Administra-
tion China Policy: Overlapping Priorities, Uneasy Adjust-
ments and Hardening toward Beijing”, Journal of Contemporary 
China 28, no. 118 (2019): 519–37. 
China Sea, mercantilist economic practices and an 
authoritarian hardening have all changed America’s 
perception of China into a negative one.171 Because of 
unfair practices, disenchantment has spread among 
the US business community, traditionally an influ-
ential lobby for engagement with China. Neverthe-
less, large parts of the US economy have no interest in 
the administration intensifying the trade war. In June 
2019, the US Chamber of Commerce warned of the 
immense costs of the trade war. It urged the Trump 
administration to resume negotiations with China 
and work with allies towards a comprehensive trade 
agreement with China.172 Human rights groups, 
which have traditionally had a hard time opposing 
the China lobby, see their concerns confirmed as 
China has expanded the surveillance state and set up 
re-education camps in Xinjiang.173 The human rights 
situation in China has led to bipartisan initiatives in 
Congress to push the administration for a more robust 
response to China’s repression of the Uighurs, for 
example by imposing sanctions on Chinese party 
officials.174 There is also a new concern that China is 
trying to influence US society and politics in a variety 
of ways, be it through Chinese-born Americans, be it 
through the Confucius Institutes, be it through think 
tanks, universities, the media or the business world.175 
Congress took up this concern in a number of hear-
 
171 See David Shambaugh, “The New American Bipartisan 
Consensus on China Policy”, China-US Focus, 21 September 
2018; Zack Cooper and Annie Kowalewski, The New Washing-
ton Consensus (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Insti-
tute, 21 December 2018); Richard C. Bush and Ryan Hass, 
“The China Debate Is Here to Stay”, Order from Chaos, 4 March 
2019. On public opinion see Laura Silver, Kat Devlin and 
Christine Huang, U.S. Views of China Turn Sharply Negative amid 
Trade Tensions (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 13 
August 2019); Justin McCarthy, “Americans’ Favorable Views 
of China Take 12-Point Hit”, Gallup, 11 March 2019. 
172 See Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson and James Politi, “US 
Business Urges Trump to End China Trade War”, Financial 
Times, 17 June 2019. 
173 See Paul Sonne, “As Trump Escalates China Trade 
Dispute, Economic Ties Lose Stabilizing Force in Matters 
of National Security”, The Washington Post, 19 May 2019. 
174 See Edward Wong, “Lawmakers Push Trump to Act 
against China on Uighur Detention”, The New York Times, 
14 November 2018. 
175 See China’s Influence & American Interests. Promoting Con-
structive Vigilance. Report of the Working Group on Chinese Influence 
Activities in the United States, ed. Larry Diamond and Orville 
Schell, revised version (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 
2019). 
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ings and legislative initiatives, including the Foreign 
Influence and Transparency Act and the Countering 
Foreign Propaganda Act. This concern about Chinese 
influence is coupled with a fear of espionage.176 
Given this anti-China mood, it is not surprising 
that the tones struck by some of the democratic presi-
dential candidates do not differ much from those of 
Trump’s.177 His campaign advisors have reportedly 
been keeping a very close eye on how the democratic 
presidential candidates are positioning themselves on 
the China question.178 At present, there are no politi-
cal incentives to challenge the anti-China sentiments 
and to paint the threat posed by China as anything 
other than dire.179 
In this respect, those foreign policy and China ex-
perts who warn of the dangers of a purely confronta-
tional policy, who by no means see US China policy 
as a failure and who try to counteract a narrowing of 
the discourse, have become politically marginalized. 
Fundamental unease with the current course of US 
China policy was expressed in an open letter to the 
President and Congress, initiated by some China ex-
perts and signed by around 100 other people, includ-
ing many who were involved with China in former 
administrations. The signatories warn against treating 
China as an “economic enemy or existential national 
security threat that must be confronted in every 
sphere”. They consider the fear that China could re-
place the United States as the leading global power as 
exaggerated – if China sees this as a realistic or desir-
 
176 See Rush Doshi and Robert D. Williams, “Is China 
Interfering in American Politics?” Lawfare, 1 October 2018. 
177 For a critical view, see Philip H. Gordon, “How Demo-
crats Can Get Tough on China – without Imitating Trump”, 
Foreign Policy, 25 June 2019. However, in US discourse, Demo-
cratic candidates have also been advised to place the rivalry 
with China at the center of their foreign policy program. 
Accordingly, they should use this competition for domestic 
purposes, namely to promote state investments aimed 
at preserving US technological competitiveness. Thomas 
Wright, “Democrats Need to Place China at the Center of 
Their Foreign Policy”, Order from Chaos, 15 May 2019. 
178 See Alan Rappeport, “Trump Touts Progress with 
China, but Pressure Grows for a Tough Deal”, The New York 
Times, 25 February 2019. 
179 When Joseph Biden, the former vice-president and 
presidential candidate, relativized economic competition 
from China, he was met with strong resistance from both 
political camps. See Nahal Toosi, “Biden Girds for Clash with 
Trump over China”, Politico, 5 June 2019. 
able goal at all.180 Representatives of this position, 
a kind of “smart competition”, warn against ceasing 
cooperation with China. They are of the opinion that, 
overall, the previous US policy mixing cooperation, 
deterrence and pressure was successful, but that it 
needs an adjustment, namely more economic pres-
sure and military deterrence, in order to respond to 
China’s mercantilist economic policy and its growing 
“assertiveness” in foreign policy.181 
“Competition” has become the central topos in the 
American debate on China. It seems that the strategic 
rivalry with China is developing into the “organising 
principle of US economic, foreign and security poli-
cies”.182 A globally active foreign policy is thus given a 
new justification.183 However, the narrative of “great 
power competition” is not a strategy and says nothing 
about the policy areas and regions in which this rivalry 
is to take place. Are they all equal, or is there an in-
terest-led hierarchy? And what is the goal?184 Should 
the shift of power between the United States and 
China be reversed if possible and should all available 
means be used for this purpose and economic rela-
tions largely cut off? Should comprehensive pressure 
be exerted, as in the strategy of containing the Soviet 
Union?185 Is the goal the long-term weakening of 
China, even regime change? Or must China’s increase 
in power be taken as irreversible and a certain degree 
of economic interdependence be accepted? The latter 
would mean forming sufficient countervailing power 
in conjunction with other states to deter China from 
 
180 M. Taylor Fravel et al., “China Is Not the Enemy”, 
The Washington Post, 7 July 2019. 
181 See Orville Schell and Susan L. Shirk (Chairs), Course 
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Force Report (New York: Asia Society, Center on U.S.-China 
Relations, February 2019); Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sulli-
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Both Challenge and Coexist with China”, Foreign Affairs, 
1 August 2019. Campbell, under President Obama Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, was 
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182 Martin Wolf, “The Looming 100-year US-China Con-
flict”, Financial Times, 4 June 2019. 
183 See Stephen Wertheim, “Is It Too Late to Stop a New 
Cold War with China?” The New York Times, 8 June 2019. 
184 The danger, as has rightly been pointed out, is that 
power rivalry becomes an end in itself. Ali Wyne, “America’s 
Blind Ambition Could Make It a Victim of Global Competi-
tion”, The National Interest, 11 February 2019. 
185 As argued by Gordon G. Chang, “It’s Time for America 
to Break with China”, The National Interest, 19 June 2019. 
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taking risky revisionist steps. Whatever the direction 
US China policy takes, without the involvement of 
other states, the United States can pursue neither a 
policy of comprehensive confrontation nor one of 
collective balancing.186 
Consequences for Europe 
Whether President Trump is re-elected in November 
2020 or whether a Democrat will move into the White 
House – one thing is certain: the strategic rivalry 
with China will have a strong impact on US foreign 
policy. Washington will perceive the world, and 
therefore also Europe, primarily through a “China 
prism”.187 For a United States more focused than be-
fore on the Indo-Pacific and competition with China, 
crises in Europe and on the European periphery 
might become secondary, and the fear of costly en-
tanglements may shape policy in and around Europe.188 
Washington’s pressure on its allies to take a stand in 
the intensifying Sino-American conflict and clearly 
side with the United States will grow rather than 
diminish.189 If, as a result of the American-Chinese 
world conflict, two “bounded orders” emerged, one 
dominated by the United States and one by China, 
Europe would find itself in a difficult position.190 
 
186 For a discussion of strategic options, see Hal Brands 
and Zack Cooper, “After the Responsible Stakeholder, What? 
Debating America’s China Strategy”, Texas National Security 
Review 2, no. 2 (2019): 69–81; Hal Brands, “The Lost Art of 
Long-Term Competition”, The Washington Quarterly 41, no. 4 
(2019): 31–51; Nien-chung Chang-Liao, “From Engagement 
to Competition? The Logic of the US China Policy Debate”, 
Global Policy 10, no. 2 (2019): 250–57. 
187 “Regardless of who is in the White House, European 
countries must prepare for a world in which they will be 
viewed by Washington through a China prism – much in 
the same way that Europe was seen through a Soviet lens 
during the Cold War.” Noah Barkin, “The U.S. Is Losing 
Europe in Its Battle with China”, The Atlantic, 4 June 2019. 
188 This fear was already voiced under Obama in connec-
tion with the “pivot” to Asia. See Sven Bernhard Gareis and 
Reinhard Wolf, “Home Alone? The US Pivot to Asia and Its 
Implications for the EU’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy”, European Foreign Affairs Review 21 (2016), Special Issue, 
133–50. 
189 See Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Rachel Rizzo, “The U.S. 
or China? Europe Needs to Pick a Side”, Politico, 12 August 2019. 
190 John J. Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall 
of the Liberal International Order”, International Security 43, 
no. 4 (2019): 7–50 (49f.). 
European policy towards China has long followed 
the “liberal” integrative approach. It was based on the 
optimistic expectations that in the process of integra-
tion China would be socialized into a constructive 
international actor and that economic modernization 
would lead to political liberalization. The security 
dimension of China’s rise has long played no signifi-
cant role in the European approach. But Europe’s 
view of China has also changed. Hopes of political 
liberalization have been dashed. China’s influence in 
and on Europe is clearly noticeable,191 often making 
it impossible to reach a common position when it 
comes to human rights abuses or China’s claims in 
the South China Sea. Europe no longer sees China 
primarily as an economic opportunity. A European 
Commission paper from March 2019 expresses a 
changed view, in which China is regarded as a “co-
operation partner”, as an “economic competitor” and 
as a “systemic rival promoting alternative models of 
governance”, depending on the policy field.192 How-
ever, a more sceptical view of China does not mean 
that the Trump administration’s zero-sum approach 
is very popular in Europe.193 China’s rise affects the 
United States and Europe to different degrees; thus 
threat perceptions will continue to differ.194 There is 
neither a status conflict nor a global competition for 
influence between Europe and China. Moreover, no 
security dilemmas shape the relationship. The secu-
rity policy perspective is not a priority and therefore 
does not overshadow all areas. 
The United States will try to integrate Europe into 
its China policy in order to prevent European tech-
nology from strengthening its global rival. Washing-
 
191 See François Godement and Abigaël Vasselier, China 
at the Gates: a New Power Audit of EU-China Relations (London: 
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Thorsten Benner et al., Authoritarian Advance. Responding to 
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Public Policy Institute/Mercator Institute for China Studies, 
February 2018). 
192 European Commission, EU–China – a Strategic Outlook 
(Strasbourg, 12 March 2019). In addition, see Andrew Small, 
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for Washington”, Foreign Affairs, 3 April 2019; Michael Peel, 
Lucy Hornby and Rachel Sanderson, “European Foreign 
Policy: a New Realism on China”, Financial Times, 20 March 
2019. 
193 See Barkin, “The U.S. Is Losing Europe” (see note 187). 
194 See Scott A. W. Brown, Power, Perception and Foreign 
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ton wants to secure its lead over China in the com-
petition over high technologies. The Trump admin-
istration views export controls as a key instrument 
in its rivalry with China. The denial of advanced tech-
nologies is seen as a means of hindering and slowing 
down China’s (and Russia’s) military technological 
progress. Without the inclusion of America’s Euro-
pean allies in an export control regime, China could 
in many cases switch to high technology from 
Europe.195 Whether this means that the United States 
will return to something like the former Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) 
is as yet unclear.196 
CoCom, which ceased its activities in 1994, was 
used by the United States and its allies to coordinate 
export controls vis-à-vis the Communist states during 
the East-West conflict. The dissolution of CoCom also 
marked the end of transatlantic coordination on the 
control of civilian and military technologies supplied 
to China. CoCom’s “successor”, the Wassenaar 
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional 
Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, does not 
target specific countries or groups of countries and 
has a much looser institutional structure. While the 
European allies had no interest in restricting trade in 
dual-use technologies with China, the United States 
maintained export controls. Since the 1990s, how-
ever, Washington has held the view that strict export 
controls should only play a very limited role and 
that too strict an approach would diminish the profits 
and, indirectly, the innovative capacity of US firms.197 
If, as it seems, export restrictions become more im-
portant to the United States in its China policy, then 
 
195 See Dong Jung Kim, “Trading with the Enemy? The 
Futility of US Commercial Countermeasures against the 
Chinese Challenge”, The Pacific Review 30, no. 3 (2017): 289–
308. The author argues that the United States has little 
chance of successfully introducing security policy-motivated 
trade and technology restrictions against China, as other 
countries, above all European ones, would step in as sup-
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196 See Christopher Ashley Ford, Assistant Secretary of 
State for International Security and Nonproliferation, “Re-
marks at the American Academy for Strategic Education”, 
Washington, D.C., 12 June 2019. In addition, see Aaron 
L. Friedberg, Rethinking the Economic Dimension of U.S. China 
Strategy (Washington, D.C.: American Academy for Strategic 
Education, August 2017). 
197 See Hugo Meijer, Trading with the Enemy. The Making of US 
Export Control Policy toward the People’s Republic of China (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016). 
Washington has two (not mutually exclusive) options 
for involving other states. Firstly, Washington could 
try to work out a multilateral export control system 
in presumably laborious negotiations with its allies. 
Secondly, Washington could use the extraterritorial 
levers of its export control system and its sanction 
laws to force European companies to choose between 
the American and the Chinese market. If European 
firms had to make such a choice, this would have far 
more serious consequences than in the case of Iran. 
China is Europe’s most important trading partner 
after the United States.198 
There may be good reasons to support the United 
States in its negotiations with China to some extent. 
It might be advisable to coordinate policy on justified 
economic demands and to take action against Chinese 
practices within the framework of the World Trade 
Organization, for which President Trump has little 
regard. If one had to choose between a liberal rule-
based order under the predominant influence of the 
United States and an international order increasingly 
shaped by China, this decision would probably be 
simple. However, the United States under Trump is 
not interested in preserving the liberal order. Instead, 
its aim is to guarantee its supremacy, free from insti-
tutional constraints and self-restrictions. The emerg-
ing US-Chinese world conflict leaves Germany and 
Europe faced with the question of whether, to what 
extent and under what conditions they should sup-
port the United States in its strategic rivalry with 
China. In terms of strategic hedging, Germany and 
Europe must also be clear about how they can at least 
create the capacity to pursue a China policy that will 
safeguard their interests. 
 
198 Certainly not all EU countries would be affected to 
the same extent. Countries with a strong high-tech sector are 
more likely to be affected by tighter American export con-
trols, for example in semiconductor technology. Here, it 
could make sense for Germany to try and coordinate with 
the Netherlands and Belgium. See Brigitte Dekker and 
Maaike Okano-Heijmans, The US-China Trade-tech Stand-off and 
the Need for EU Action on Export Control (The Hague: The Clin-
gendael Institute, August 2019), 20f. 
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Abbreviations 
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
BRI Belt and Road Initiative 
CINC Composite Indicator of National Capability 
CoCom Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls 
CRS Congressional Research Service 
IDFC International Development Finance Corporation 
OPIC Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership  
UN United Nations 
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development  
USMCA United States-Mexico-Canada-Agreement 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
